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ABSTRACT
Title of Thesis: Process Hazard Review for Drug Development
Rudolph Robert Schwarz, Master of Science, 1987
Thesis directed by: Professor John Mihalasky
The development of drugs has become increasingly complex,
requiring the use of a wide variety of pharmaceutical actives and
isolated intermediates, a majority of which are not always completely
characterized with respect to their hazard potential. This can present
a source of potential exposure to those who handle these substances
during initial drug development, manufacturing of the drug active and
ultimately the finished pharmaceutical product. It is, therefore,
essential that safety and health information be documented and
communicated during the entire drug development process.
The need for application of process hazard review techniques to
the development of new drug materials is becoming increasingly more
evident. Developing trends in health and safety legislation, along
with changes in the technical aspects of accident control, now make
utilization of process hazard review programs in the pharmaceutical
industry a necessary element in preventing employee injury and health
hazards during drug development. Often little time is devoted to
formal safety reviews during the research and development (scale-up)
stages where valuable safety data is likely to be generated.
Therefore, it is desirable to implement and use it to control potential
hazards.
The primary aim of this paper is to provide a practical resource
for safety personnel which stresses the importance of conducting

process reviews at all stages of drug development. It will provide a
process review format for recording new safety and health data as it is
generated to assist in the prevention of accident/injury and capital
loss. The paper is also intended to promote the use of safety reviews
in drug development, and to help the safety professional become more
involved in the transfer of safety and health information during that
process.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION TO PROCESS HAZARDS REVIEW

Background

All new projects embody some element of change, but in the
pharmaceutical industry, the degree of change experienced in new drug
product development is often considerable. It is important to
recognize that the amount of established experience expressed in
policies or written guidelines is limited by the extent of existing
knowledge and can only be beneficial to the extent to which it applies

to new products, new plant equipment and new methods of operation
involved in new product development. In recent years, it has become

more readily apparent that although written hazard evaluation
procedures are extremely valuable, it is also particularly important to
supplement them with an imaginative anticipation of hazards when new
products are initiated and developed.
Process hazard analysis in the pharmaceutical industry, however,
is generally not as well established as in the chemical industry. A
rigid regulatory environment established by the Food and Drug

Administration to guarantee drug purity and efficacy have provided a
good measure of safety and health protection for workers handling drug

materials and process equipment. However, a great deal of effort is
put into the development of a new drug prior to its authorization for
commercial manufacture, and it is during these stages of development
that the process can undergo frequent and significant changes. Change
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in the discovery and pilot plant stages is usually a dynamic and
exciting time, but seldom routine or without potential hazard.
Therefore, safety and evaluation of hazards should receive equally
important consideration at the initial and intermediate stages of
development as in the production or manufacturing phase.
The principal objectives of using hazard evaluation in new drug
development is to provide an efficient and safe process for the
manufacturing of a drug product. As a result, a considerable amount of
very detailed safety information can be obtained and designed into the
final production process if a hazard review is properly conducted
during the previous stages.
Ideally, all process hazards are identified during design and
construction and controls are incorporated prior to start up. A single
process change may not introduce a hazard, but a series of changes can
easily introduce serious hazards. These changes include increased
production, equipment modification, corrosion, erosion, changes in
temperatures, raw material changes, higher pressures and new catalysts.
With insurance, compensation, and replacement costs rising, and
with federal and local laws focusing attention on safety, health and
environment, keeping process incidents and overall risk to a minimum is
a prime business requirement. The use of hazard reviews will also help
to counter risk trends where there is major expansion in the use of
flammable and unstable chemicals, chemical processes that require
higher operating temperatures and pressures, increased handling of
hazardous chemicals and mechanical processes which reduce the number of
available personnel to handle emergencies.
A paper on process hazards by Trevor Klatz notes the following:
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"The traditional method of identifying hazards, in use from
the dawn of technology until the present day, was to build the
plant and see what happened"
He uses an old adage to emphasize the obsolescence of this type of
thinking, "every dog is allowed one bite..."; until the dog bites
someone, we can say that we did not know it would. This was not a bad
method when the size of an incident was limited, but it is no longer
satisfactory now that we keep "...dogs that may kill many people at one
bite". 2
When then did the more formalized method of identifying hazards
begin in the first place? It begins as systems safety in the military
sector during the late 1950s and early 1960s in weapons development
programs. It was developed in response to a need which recognized that
the destructive power of weapons and their delivery systems were
rapidly increasing and that the problem of safety of the whole system
could not be solved by mere life testing of the component. Studying
the interworking of the system elements was required to make sure the

component failures or unexpected system events would not cause
catastrophic results. "Western Electric Company and Bell Laboratory's

development of analysis techniques, using Boolean algebra, and the
Boeing Company development of fault tree analysis, in connection with
their Minute Man missile contract, began the development of system
safety techniques. From this evolved a specific standard for system
weapons systems, including missiles and submarines, which have

proceeded to safety requirements now identified in the Armed Forces as

1

Klatz, Trevor A., "Eliminating Potential Procss Hazards", Chemical
Engineering, April 1, 1985, p. 40.
2 Ibid
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MIL Std.882A.

This standard has the purpose of providing a uniform

requirement and criteria for a system safety program." 3
"The development of this standard focused the necessary
alterations to safety of weapons systems and, as a result, development
of major operational readiness without a major incident. To reach this
point, however, numerous analysis techniques were developed. Among
them were : preliminary hazard analysis, sub—system analysis, failure
mode and effect analysis, criticality analysis, energy analysis,
interface analysis and flow analysis".

4

Additional techniques were developed by the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) to evaluate the safety of nuclear power systems. The
NRC development called probablistic risk analysis is more complex than
the military approach, according to Mr. J. Capps. This is due to the
fact that they do not take the approach that hazards "can be
eliminated" or that they are controlled to be "as safe as possible".

5

Because they are dealing with a large complex hazard control system
with essentially fixed elements, decisions are based on levels of

continuing risk and their acceptability. This is not the case in drug
development where processes undergo dynamic change constantly.
Following the industrial revolution, equipment began to grow
progressively more complex, involving the use of greater and greater
amounts of energy, and increased potentials for accidents, injuries and

3 Rogers, William F., Introduction to Systems Safety Engineering, New

York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc. 1971.

4 Capps, James H., "Systems Safety for Plant Safety Specialists",
Professional Safety, June 1984, p. 22.
5 Ibid.

5

damage.

Accident prevention failed to keep pace with technological

growth so the number of mishaps increased tremendously with passing
years. Corrective action was taken only after a particularly severe
accident occurred or through the continued efforts of an outstandingly
determined and energetic crusader. These efforts can be traced to
legislation for industrial safety, mine safety, railroad safety, marine

safety, and traffic safety. Unfortunately, adverse attitudes towards
accident prevention also raised roadblocks in the effort to improve
safety. There appears to be an inborn human behavior which resists
devices and procedures by which individuals can safeguard themselves or
others. The reluctance or resistance can take various forms such as:
o opposition to change
o opposition to additional effort or cost of implementing a
safeguard
o "macho" pride in completing an activity without benefit of
suitable protection
Indeed, human error has usually been considered as the primary
cause of accidents. Almost every mishap can be traced ultimately to
personnel error, even though humans have prevented accidents by taking
corrective and timely action when equipment malfunctions. Man
generally is superb in adverse situations and cannot be surpassed in
ability to overcome unforseen conditions and problems. But in today's
computerized world, systems (that could generate an accident or
intercede to prevent one) are being operated without benefit of a human
present. Unmanned systems, therefore, still presented a problem when
failures occurred or emergencies developed and it became readily
apparent that many safety problems could be solved only by good design.

6

The principle of a Process Hazards Review is based on this concept
which is an effective approach to avoiding, reducing or eliminating
hazards and dangers during design and development.
The costs of accidents have been a big factor in establishing
priorities for the health and safety of individuals. Loss experiences
in the military and non—military sectors have provided the initial
impetus for systems reviews, however, a new awareness was created for
the recognition of hazards in the 1970s with the creation of OSHA and
the Occupational Health and Safety Standards and the Environmental
Protection Agency's regulations which define toxic and hazardous
substances control and disposal.

Process Safety and Legislation

The impact of safety legislation, as well as the general awareness
of society, has created a new sense of responsibility and awareness
among professional personnel such as chemists, chemical engineers,
environmental engineers, industrial hygienists, occupational health
nurses and physicians, and safety professionals at all levels. In
addition, the need to ensure process safety as a means of preventing
public disasters has also become all too apparent in the office of
today's top corporate officers.
In the last decade alone in the chemical industry, there have been
several major disasters which have produced large loss of life,
economic loss and an erosion of public confidence. These disasters
have shown that major problems are not confined to geographical
borders. A few examples selected from recent experiences illustrate

7

the concern that the real value of safety in the manufacturing industry
has yet to be fully recognized.
"On July 10, 1976, in Seveso, a town of 17,000 population in

Northern Italy, the safety-valve stack (pressure relief) of a reactor
for making trichlorophenol (TCP) released, forming a cloud which spread
over the town and surroundings. The fallout contained the TCP with an
impurity of dioxin (dioxin is more toxic than TCP). Evacuation of the
area was required followed by decontamination and treatment of 500
persons. No recognized treatment is available for dioxin poisoning."

6

"A temporary bypass, intended to keep operations continuing during
repairs, ruptured, causing a cyclohexane vapor cloud to be released
into the air, which then ignited: 28 were killed and 36 injured inside
the work site, and 53 recorded casualties occurred outside the works.
The loss was estimated at approximately 100 million" [dollars]. 7

The Seveso, Italy disaster led to legislation which was to provide
common industry and common market members, states regulations for the
prevention of major accidents and the limitation of their consequences.
More recently, however, a poison gas release at a Union Carbide
plant in India during December of 1984 could well be the worst chemical
exposure disaster in history. Approximately 2000 people were killed
along with perhaps 200,000 cases of exposure in Bhopal and nearby
towns. Months later, in a similar plant located at Institute, West
Virginia, 135 people were injured when a chemical leaked from a

6 Fawcett, Howard H. and William S. Wood, Safety and Accident
Prevention in Chemical Operations, Second Edition, Wiley Inter-Science,
1982, p.9
7. Ibid
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Legislation of the 1980s has begun to provide a watchful eye as an

initial step to improving safety in large plant operations. OSHA's
Hazard Communication Law and state "Right-To-Know" laws will require
manufacturers of hazardous materials to label, and provide written
safety data on hazardous materials handled and produced at their
locations to employees and municipal agencies. Appropriate training of
employees is also required.
Faced with the growing regulatory pressure and battered by
continued bad publicity, companies are now beginning to take a fresh
look at hazards. Intensive efforts are being directed in areas such
as:

o

Setting up review of all chemicals used to find out how
many are toxic and how effective the safeguards are.

o

Additional training for employees to help them better
understand plant processes.

o

Review of cost cutting policies which may lead to the
purchase of substandard equipment.

o

Changes in maintenance procedures.

o

Installation of computer equipment to organize records and

control processes.
o

Increased usage of outside consultants to conduct
independent inspections.

o

The stepping up of safety reviews. Increasing their
frequency and intensity.

o

Writing emergency plans to provide explicit procedures on
how to deal with potential hazards.

o

Reducing storage of hazardous materials on site.

9

The objective of the pharmaceutical and chemical manufacturing
companies is now moving towards providing manufacturing processes which
are efficient and safe. The types of safety reviews necessary to
properly evaluate process hazards will vary by industry depending upon
the type of business conducted. Although the technologies in the
pharmaceutical and chemical industries are very similar and overlap to
a large degree, process operations and handling of hazardous materials
can vary greatly.

Chemical and Pharmaceutical Industry Process Differences

One particular factor that makes the pharmaceutical industry
unique regarding process safety is the basic fact that the end products
manufactured have a biological or physiological effect - they are
medicinal chemicals. Not only does the final product have
physiological activity, but generally, intermediate precursors in the

complex production chain also have activity. Many are potent drugs
which have human medicinal dosage levels measured in milligrams and as
such, small quantities can produce serious consequences if not handled
properly.

Some of the uniqueness in the pharmaceutical industry can be
traced to the differences in the quantities of production. The typical
chemical industry plant will produce large continuous quantities of
basic chemicals, plastics, resins, etc., and the processes are likely
being handled in bulk systems by highly trained personnel skilled in
handling a relatively small variety of chemicals. These operations
will, for the most part, remain unchanged from day to day and the

10

operators will handle and carry out the same process procedures that
have been followed for many months or years.
In the typical pharmaceutical plant, however, the situation is

quite different. Pharmaceutical plants are generally small batch
producers rather than a large volume continuous producer of its
products. The variety of products produced can be very broad involving
a wide range of chemical processes. Because small batch operations can
be nonrepetitive, the problems associated with running them can be more
serious. A batch run today may be a year's inventory. By the time the

product is produced again, few operators remember all the special
precautions that may be required in running the process safely and, in

fact, may not be aware of process changes which may have taken place in
the interim.

Process Safety and Future Technology

An even more serious concern lies ahead for the pharmaceutical
industry in exploring the frontier of biotechnology. In fact, as the
pharmaceutical industry moves to producing products with efficacy at

microgram dosages, to products that are biological in nature and to
products that effect the most basic of genetic and cellular functions
process reviews will have to focus increasingly more on individual

safety.

8

While guidelines for recombinant DNA research have been

specified by the National Institute of Health, additional guidelines

8 Cooper, Theodore, M.D., Ph.D., "The Corporate Impacts of Occupational
Health and Safety Programs", Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Fourth Annual
Conference on Occupational Health and Safety, Sept. 10, 1985, p. 14.
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for biohazards may still be needed. The burden may fall on industry to
provide process control measures to ensure employee and public safety.
The potential effects of biohazards, if not controlled from the
beginning, may be significant and only reinforce the need to conduct
more frequent and sophisticated reviews of new pharmaceutical
materials.
It becomes obvious then that to increase the margin of safety in
complex operations such as pharmaceutical processes, a company should
consider a hazards review approach to safety — in effect a "walk—
through" process to identify all potential faults that could cause an
accident and/or possibly a chain of negative events.

Some Current Process Review Program Methods and Definitions

There are a variety of safety review methods available to help
identify hazards. The theoretical techniques most commonly used
include procedures such as fault tree analysis, the Dow fire and
explosion index, failure mode analysis, event trees, Hazard and
Operability Study (HAZOP) and Techniques for Human Error Prediction
(THERP). A common disadvantage of these techniques is that they
require a great deal of time and effort by specialists in various areas
if the results are to be meaningful and reasonable. Clearly, there is
no quick and easy method for conducting these kinds of studies and
though they may appear overwhelming at times, process hazard reviews
are worthwhile if they prevent serious accidents, property loss, and
public disasters.
The challenge in the pharmaceutical process industry today,
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however, is to provide a sufficiently flexible process review protocol
that will encourage the use of safety reviews at all levels of the new
drug development process and one that will speed drug development by
preventing not only accidents but providing answers to safety questions
that will be asked later.
Many of the major chemical and pharmaceutical companies today use
systematic and formalized approaches for evaluating new (and in many
cases, old) processes and hazardous materials attendant to their
manufacture. The degrees of concern over need in establishing a
chemical process hazard review protocol has often been dictated by the
unplanned incident which results in a large loss. It is the
recognition and control, or elimination of unplanned incidents, to
which the process hazard review must address itself. A more specific
definition of a process review is provided by Mr. J. Hoffman of Parke
Davis who states: 9
the phrase Chemical Process Hazard Review has widely varying
meanings. To the professional safety engineer, it connotes a
broadly based review of a chemical process which, when conducted
properly, would provide assurances that a process can be conducted
"safely"; safe for scientists in the laboratory, the technicians
in the pilot plant and the chemical operators in the manufacturing
plant. Chemical engineers, destined to design both the process
and equipment, may depend on such a review to provide the details
necessary to design the process "safely". Environmental engineers
and control specialists consider a review process as a means for
estimating risk to environmental exposure (air, water and ground)
and a source of data to develop compliance information.
Management needs the assurance from both line managers and staff
functions that the process can be conducted and, the hazards
associated with the process in its entirety, are identified to the
extent that appropriate risk/benefit decisions can be made. An
appropriate Chemical Process Hazard Review can and should meet all
of these needs."
...

9 Hoffman, John M. and Daniel C. Moser, Chemical Process Hazard Review,
ASC Symposium Series 274, American Chemical Society, 1985, p.1.
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Taking Mr. Hoffman's definition, and descriptions from other
sources, a Process Hazard Review, can be defined as an intensive
examination, from both the theorectical and practical standpoints, of a
designated process for exposures to personnel and property. A process

Hazard Review also stresses early identification of potential safety
and health hazards and elimination or control through development of
adequate preventative measures.
Emphasis should be placed on areas such as:
o

o
o

o

health effects and exposures due to materials handling and
transfer operations.

regulatory compliance requirements.
suitability of operating procedures.
suitability of fire and explosion control devices, equipment
design, materials of construction.

In addition, a review should be distinct from, and in addition to,
prestart-up, equipment acceptance, or area inspections. It should also

be separate from investigations prompted by accidents or unusual
incidents and periodic reviews performed for the purpose of updating
procedures.
A Process Hazard Review (PHR) should be initiated for all programs

requiring or involving:
o

The use of highly toxic or hazardous material including, but
not limited to, recognized carcinogens, mutagens, highly
reactive compounds and teratogens, explosives, radioactive
compounds, biological agents and drug actives.

o

The use of process equipment in which significant pressures are
developed (e.g. >100 psi).

o

Radiation sources - ionizing and non-ionizing.

o

All new capital projects - development of new products and/or
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technology and proposed long term R&D efforts.
o

Changes in existing operations (i.e. increased pressures,
temperature, changes in raw materials, introduction of new
organism strains, etc.).

o

Changes in staffing of major operations.

o

Large scale material transfer and manual operations.

Organization of a Process Review

The need to check process design for errors has been recognized for
some time but has traditionally been done on an individual basis. This
method, however, is not as likely to detect potential hazards concerned
with the interaction of a number of functions or specializations. In
order to anticipate whether the experimental design or process will
operate as intended under all possible circumstances, the combined
skills of a group of experts is required. Therefore, in order to
effectively conduct process reviews, a committee should be established.
A Process Hazard Review Committee is needed to insure that the process
has been thoroughly examined, the destructive potential of identified
hazards has been assessed and that sound engineering judgement has been
provided in formulating appropriate control measures.
In fulfilling its responsibilities, the committee must direct its
efforts toward identifying hazards associated with processes that could
cause explosion, fire, release of large quantities of toxic materials,
serious injury, and inappropriate exposure to chemicals. The committee
must also evaluate the magnitude of the hazards for probable area
involvement, number of personnel affected, potential property loss and
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frequency of occurrence. Finally, the committee must develop practical
recommendations to eliminate or control hazards.

Composition and Responsibilities of the Process Review Committee

The effectiveness of the review depends on the skills, knowledge
and effort of the process hazard review committee members. Therefore,
the committee chairman should be in a management position sufficient to
command the resources needed to successfully accomplish the review. At
the minimum, the review committee should be composed of permanent and
rotatable personnel.

The non-permanent personnel would be rotated

depending on the process being studied.

Corporate Safety and

Industrial Hygiene and Environmental groups should participate in all
committee meetings to provide advise on the use of personal protective
equipment, fire protection equipment, emergency facilities and new
approaches to safety management. Typically, a Process Review Committee

would consist of the following type of personnel in addition to Safety
and Industrial Hygiene.

10

o process engineer - usually the chemical engineer who drew up
the flowsheet is involved when an actual potential hazard is

identified. He suggests methods for minimizing or eliminating
such a hazard.
o plant supervisor - responsible for operation, has scientific or
chemical engineering background.

10

DuPont, Process Hazards Management, Manual prepared by Finishes and

Fabricated Products Department, E.I. duPont deNemours & Co., Fourth
Edition, copyright 1984, page 3.
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o

process investigation manager - responsible for investigating
technical problems and for transferring laboratory results to
plant-scale operations.

o

independent team leader - job is to ensure that the
committee follows procedure. Needs to be skilled in guiding a
group of people and must pay meticulous attention to detail.

Depending on the nature of the process, other individuals that
could contribute and should be invited to the review process are on an
"as needed" basis are
o

instrumentation design engineer - because modern chemical
processes contain sophisticated control and monitoring systems.

o

research chemist - If new chemistry is involved and/or chemist
works with the project, he provides a basic reactive sequence
summary, offers his opinion on specific operations, chemical
components, and prepares formalized process directions.

o

operations foreperson - knows what actually happens rather than
what is supposed to happen.

o

operator - actually performs the work and can provide real
workplace input.

o

mechanic intimately familiar with the operation - has handled
mechanical maintenance and should be familiar with the many
faults that can occur.

When needed, other individuals with specialized knowledge or skills
can also be called in on a consultation basis. Objectivity of the
committee is the key toward completing a successful review in which all
identified or suspected hazards have been included in a documented
format regardless of anticipated acceptance or rejection. As a result,
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the work of future review committees covering the subject area may be
significantly reduced.
Occasionally, there will be more than one process that will require
review. In a case where more than one process is involved, an initial
priority list should be established. After experience is gained,
management will be able to develop a review frequency and/or priority
schedule with little trouble. It is important that management
initially identify the process to be reviewed because committee
selection is dependent on the process to be reviewed.
Following identification of the process to be reviewed, a committee
chairman should be selected and instructed as to his/her
responsibilities. Committee chairman candidates should include either
the supervisor of the area in which the process under review is
located, or the supervisor responsible for the process. When selected,
the chairman should be instructed as to:
o purpose and procedures involved in conducting a review
o selection of the appropriate method of analysis
o available material covering the process (such as past reports of
the process).
The committee members should then be chosen based on a demonstrated
knowledge of the process and preferably a recognized expert in some
aspect of the operation to be studied.
After the committee membership has been fully organized, an
organizational meeting should be held to:
o

Acquaint members with the studies, objective and procedures to
be followed.

o

Assign each member a specific portion (or portions) of the
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process to review.
o Establish a timetable for meetings and deadlines for completing
tasks.
o Develop specific questions and checklists as needed.
o Provide a process information update with data covering:
- Process Chemistry (exothermicity, reaction rates, cooling
rates, side reactions, effects of contaminants, temperatures,
pressure, etc.).
- Process material hazards (toxicity, reactivity, flammability,
compatibility, infectivity, radioactivity, physical
properties, etc.)
- Examine process flow diagram or experimental design narrative
and/or outline.
- Review equipment descriptions (materials of construction,
operating temperature range, pressure ratings, capacity,
instrumentation, safety devices supplied, etc.).
- Review operating instructions - including safety, health and
environmental needs.
- Review emergency shutdown procedures.
Following the initial organizational meeting, the committee should
then conduct a field review. During the field review, operator
practices and equipment suitability and location can be evaluated.
Information obtained from the field review will supplement information
covered during the committee meeting and help to provide objectivity

and practicality to committee recommendations.
As the information is gathered, a determination must be made by the
committee as to what method of analysis will be used to evaluate the
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process.

There are three commonly used methods known as What if?,

Failure Mode and Effect, and Fault Tree Analysis.

Checklists and a

technique developed in the 1970s called Hazop are also used.

11

A brief

description of each to show the basic differences among the methods is
given at this time, however, each technique is discussed in more detail
in the next chapter.

Common Process Review Techniques

1. What if? — Most Common Method

o This method is generally applied to those relatively
uncomplicated processes that can be reviewed from raw
materials to final product.
o Review members formulate and answer What if? questions at
each handling point in a process step to evaluate the effects
of components failure or procedural errors in the process.

2. Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA)

o Used when a specific item of equipment, such as reactor, is
to be studied?
o

C ommittee would assess the effects of component failures and

the occurrence of certain specified events or errors in the

11

Gibson, S.B. and A. Shafaghi, "Hazard and Operatiblity Study, A
Flexible Technique for Process System Safety and Reliability Analysis",
Chemical Process Hazard Review, ASC Symposium Series 274, American
Chemical Society, 1985, p. 34
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process.
o

Used for determining the possible causes of a preselected
undesired event.

3. Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)

o

Committee would analyze the sequence of subevents and the
combinations of causes that could result in the undesired
event.

4. Checklist

o

Provides a more organized approach to processes which are
slightly complex.

o

Uses lists of words and phrases that will stimulate questions
concerning the subject.

5. Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) Study

o

Designed to anticipate hazardous problems in areas of novelty
and new technology where past experience was limited.

o

Every part of the process is examined to discover how
deviations from intended design can occur and how these
deviations can cause hazards.

Upon selection of the method of analysis and ultimate evaluation of

findings and observations, the committee should develop
recommendations. After each committee member has identified all
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potential hazards associated with the portion of the process he/she has
studied, the committee should meet to define and evaluate the
identified hazards, make recommendations to remedy problems and set
priorities for correction of deficiencies.
Following the development of recommendations, the committee should
issue a report summarizing its findings including existing or potential
hazards identified and recommendations for follow—up or corrective
measures. Target dates for completion of recommendations should also
be included in the report. Copies of the report should be issued to
all committee members and appropriate levels of management to help
ensure that process safety needs will be met satisfactorily.

Deciding on an Analysis Method

The most difficult decision, of course, is what method of analysis
should be used. Since process operations will vary from the
exploratory stages, on through development and into manufacturing, the
approach to identifying and controlling hazards through process reviews
must be flexible, but organized. Organized and systematic process
hazard reviews are particularly needed as a tool to increase process
reliability and to meet today's regulatory demands. The two can clash
in radicilly different environments such as research and manufacturing,
thereby discouraging use of the process hazards review system in less
structured environments such as research.
The following table provides some suggestions in the selection of
types of review which resulted from thinking and decision making by
DuPont Experimental Station scientists who conducted an evaluation of
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the complexity of a process as it relates to the scale of the process
operation. The PHR selection method is used in an ascending order of
intensity, the "What if?", the Checklist, the Failure Mode and Effect,
and the Fault Tree. 12

TABLE 1 PHR SELECTION METHOD

Batch Process

Scale

Continuous Process

Lab/SW

Service

Lab/SW

Service

Exploratory Research

What if?

What If?

What if?

What if?

Research Scale-Up

What if?

What if?

What if?

Checklist

Process Development

Checklist

Checklist

Checklist

FM & E

Start-Up/Shutdown

FM & E

FM & E

FM & E

FTA

Freestanding
Equipment

What if? or Checklist

What if? or Checklist

SW = Semi-works

As can be seen from the table, in batch operations, the "What if?"
method is most commonly used with the checklist and failure mode and
effect method is used in larger, more complex operations.
The use of and need for the various types of methods in conducting
process hazard reviews during the major phases of new drug development

as noted previously is explored in the next chapter.

12 Hoffman, Mary J., "Hazard Review in a Chemical Research Environment",
Chemical Process Hazard Review, ASC Symposium series 874, American
Chemical Safety, 1985, p. 11.

CHAPTER II

PROCESS HAZARD ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES

The following sections discuss some of the more common analysis
methods available to a Process Review Team and the appropriateness for
a given process environment.

Methods of Analysis — General

As noted previously, there are three commonly used methods for
reviewing process hazards:
o What if: (Checklist)

o Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA)
o Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)
Each method differs in how thoroughly it analyzes hazards. The
procedures used in the first two methods, however, are similar because:
1. The failure of each system or component is assumed.
2. The consequences of the failure are assessed.
3.

The seriousness and frequency of the consequences are

estimated.
Other techniques such as Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP) and
Management Oversight and Risk Tree (MORT) analysis were developed in

contrast to the traditional methods because they are simple, creative,
flexible, and increase the tools available for improving process safety
and reliability.

23

24

What If?

The "What if?" evaluation is performed by inspecting equipment as
installed in the field. Of course, this cannot be done for designs or
even for a plant under construction until reasonably close to start—up.
The method's lack of structure and the absence of well defined
procedures limits its thoroughness. A modified What If? (checklist)

should, therefore, be utilized for evaluation of design.
The Checklist method provides a more organized approach.

13

This is

accomplished by the use of lists of words or phrases that would
stimulate questions concerning the subject. For example, the phrase
"Personal Protection" should lead to questions relating to the adequacy
of ventilation and to the toxicity of the chemicals which are used.
Checklists should be applicable to the site or department for which it
is written.
For the "What if" technique to be effective, each segment of the
process under study must be challenged by qualified committee members
who ask "What if?" questions at each handling or processing step. When
employed in a systematic manner involving an exchange of information
among members of the committee, this method of analysis can be very
productive in identifying and correcting serious process hazards.
An advantage of the "What if" (Checklist) method is that it
includes reminders to use in-house services like the Library Literature
Search, Analytical Services, Computer Applications and Health and
Safety Staff department resources.

13

DuPont, Safety and Fire Protection Guidelines, Section 6.4, "Process
Hazard Reviews", July, 1981.
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The "What If?" method, if employed systematically, can also be very

productive in identifying and correcting serious process hazards. It's
success, however, is dependent upon the degree of participation and
exchange of information among members of the committee.
Examples of typical questions asked during a "What if?" analysis
and a What if? Process Review Procedure flowchart are included on the

next two pages. A simple acid delivery system in which the What If?
technique is used to identify potential hazards is also provided as an
example.

14

What If? Method: Acid System Example

Process Description

The process is a batch operation (see Figure 2) consisting of a
measuring tank that is filled to a predetermined level through a fill
valve (4) and a pump (9). The quantity of acid is determined by an
operator's observing the rise of liquid in the sight glass and closing

the fill valve (4) when he has the proper amount in the tank. The tank
is vented to the atmosphere through a dryer (3) containing a desiccant
to prevent moisture from being admitted to the tank as its contents are

emptied into the process downstream.
All the components of the process under review are included in the
sketch on the following pages. This process does not include the

supply tank and equipment downstream from the outlet valve (5).
14

DuPont, Process Hazards Management, E.I. duPont de Nemours and
Company (Inc.), fourth edition, revised 1984, section 5.5 - 5.11.
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Figure 1
DuPont;
Process Hazards Management Manual, Fourth Edition, 1984,
Section 5,5

27

Figure 2
DuPont; Process Hazards Management Manual, Fourth Edition 1984, Section
5.8
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Operating Procedures

Step

1. Ensure that the outlet valve (5) is closed.

2. Open the fill valve (4).

3. Start the pump (9).

4. Observe the sight glass (2) for liquid rise.

5. Throttle the fill valve (4) closed as the level of the liquid
approaches the full mark. Close the fill valve when the tank is
full.

6. Stop the pump (9).
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What If? Method -- Typical Questions and Answers
Question - What If:
the sight glass (2) ruptures?

Answer
-

*Liquid would spill onto the
floor and flow to the nearest
drain. No spill containment is
provided.

-

The pump (9) would be shut off.

the dryer (3) plugs

-

There

the valve (11) plugs or is closed?

-

the valve (10) plugs or is closed?

acid fume
may be an
condition in the room from the
venting of fumes around the tank
lid seal. There probably is an
industrial hygiene problem.
There would be no indication of

the acid level.
-

The pump (9) would be shut off.
This would be no problem.

-

*There would be a false (low)
tank level indication resulting
in acid overflow through the
vent and/or acid spill from the
loose-fitting lid.

the fill valve (4) fails to seat?

-

The operator would recognize the
condition and shut off the pump
(9). This would be no problem.

the pump (9) fails to stop?

-

again
would
recirculate
It
through the valve (4) and would
not be a problem.

the operator fails to observe acid
level?

-

*The acid would overflow through
the vent and/or spill from the

*Items for which corrective action should be considered.
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What If? Method -- Typical Questions and Answers (continued)
Question - What If:

Answer

the acid contaminates
the dryer (3)

-

* The dryer medium would
eventually form a mass and plug
the vent.

the dryer (3) and the valve (10)
both plug?

-

* A serious spray would result
at the lid, which is the weakest
point in the system.

a spray occurs from the top of
the tank?

-

* Any employee in the
could be sprayed.

a leak occurs at the measuring
tank?

-

* The spill would not be
contained.

-

The operator would have to wear
protective equipment to enter
the area and close the valves.

*Items for which corrective action should be considered.

vicinity
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Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA)

Use of FMEA

The Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) method can be utilized
to evaluate all aspects of a particular operation or investigate and
determine the destructive potential of each individual hazard and that
of interacting hazards. It is equipment—focused and, as such, the
users may not give proper emphasis to:
o omissions or errors in operating procedures.
o

Incorrect operational sequences in batch operations.

o The possibility of operator errors.
Hazards associated with the above aspects of a process may need to
be studied separately.
FMEA is recommended for analysis of small segments of a process
having a high hazard potential, such as a reactor or distillation
column, in contrast to an entire production operation or an operating
building. A portion of the process that is reasonably independent of
other systems, but is not too complex to analyze efficiently should be
selected.

Application of FMEA

While this method may not place emphasis on operating procedure
errors or omissions, or the possibility of operator errors, it does
assess the consequences of component failure and its effect on the
entire system. The value of the entire analysis depends on the
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availability of a sketch outlining the components of the selected
system. A sketch should be made available to committee members as
early as possible. The success of the analysis depends on the accuracy
of the sketch and that the system be shown as it presently exists. The
sketch should be a line diagram of the process which breaks down the

process into subsystems if necessary, making it easier to study all
modes of operation.

Failure or Error Mode

There are many ways in which a system component can fail, such as a
valve which is jammed closed or a power failure. Each possible mode of
failure including any potential operator error that might cause a

component to fail should be documented. Although some components can
fail and have little effect on the overall system, it is possible that
a failed component may affect the overall system very seriously.
A practical illustration of how the FMEA technique can be applied
would be in an example analysis of a simple pressure tank system
(Figure 3)

15 . The illustration shows a pressure tank which is assumed

to contain a very critical material such as one which is subject to
ignition or extremely hazardous to personnel. The pressure tank is
assumed to have a pump with piping back to the reservoir or source of
supply, pump motor and series of relays and reset switches which will
govern the activation of the pump motor. These relays in turn are
activated by pressure relief switches which sense pressure in the tank

15 Celanese Chemical Company, Inc., Corpus Christi Technical Center,
Process Safety Review Manual.
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Figure 3
Celanese; Process Hazard Review Manual, page 2
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or adjacent lines.
A preliminary analysis has been completed and it has been
determined that due to the criticality of the contents of the tank and
the probability of tank failure, there is sufficient need to do further
safety inalysis using the FMEA method.
Using the Failure Mode and Effect method, we should take into
account every possible way in which each of the system components could
fail and what would be required to minimize the probability of such
failures. Although there may be many things that could cause failure,
the two basic causes would be that the tank failed under design
environment or it failed from excess internal pressure due to
continuous pump operation. Of course, the causes of these failures
could be a failure of a weld, failure at a seam or just metal fatigue.
It would be very difficult to determine the causes without extensive
testing, and depending upon the criticality of the end undesired event,
a degree of testing and reliability research commensurate with the
risks involved would be needed. However, for the moment, if the
possible failing of the tank under design environment conditions is set
aside and accidental or unexpected rupture is considered, in this case,
it would be that the tank failed from excessive internal pressure due

to continuous pump operation. There may be many others but for the
moment one facet of it should be concentrated on and carried through.
Initially, the human factor must be considered. Someone could have
failed to press the right button; someone could have failed to shut off
the motor or allowed the motor to overrun. From a mechanical
standpoint, there could be a continuous pump motor operation due to
failure of a relay contact to open after cycle. If this occurred, the
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motor would continue to run. If we examine the illustration, it is
possible that the power was not removed from relay number two coil or
that relay number two contacts failed in the closed position. If these
possibilities are traced out, not only the potential causes can be
determined, but also where in the system the necessary safety devices
can be put that will cause the system to either deactivate completely
or at the very least to fail in a safe mode.
What about other saving methods, such as relief valves, relays in
parallel, etc? Once the failure modes have been properly identified, a

number of methods and lock-out type devices can be employed to reduce
the risk of error.

Probability of Process Failure and FMEA

The probability of failure of a process can be determined by

estimating the approximate frequency of failure in terms of failures
per hour. For a batch process, it is the number of failures per batch.
Since there are approximately 10,000 operating hours in a year (10

4

hours/year), one failure per year would correspond to a probability of
10 4 per hour. If 10,000 batches were made in a year, one failure per
year would correspond to a probability of 10

-4

failures per batch.
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Failure rates can be expressed in failures per hour when the
failure is detected promptly (within one hour). When the failure is

for a longer period, the time to failure must be determined. For

16 DuPont, Process Hazards Management, E.I. duPont deNemours and
Company (Inc.), fourth edition, revised 1984, section 6.3.
components that are inspected or tested regularly, the failure rate can

36

be assumed to be one—half the interval between inspections or tests.

Failure rates can be acquired from several sources such as:
1. Plant maintenance records.
2. Estimates made by knowledgeable operating or maintenance
personnel.
3. Failure rate data developed from other resources such as the

example Failure Probability Graph (Figure 4) and Decision Tree
(Figure 5) developed by du Pont.
Failure data from outside sources, however, should be used with
extreme caution because it may have been developed from an experience
base much different from the industry and environment being evaluated.
Due to the need for detailed records and the amount of time

required for an accurate calculation, a suggested expression of the
probability of failure as noted by du Pont, Inc. is given in table 2
below.

17

Table 2 Probability of Failure
Category

Degree of Probability

Approximate Probability
of Failure
-1

A

Extremely likely

10

B

Likely

10 -2

C

Reasonably likely

10-3

D

Unlikely

10

E

Remote

10 -5

F

Extremely remote

10 -6

-4

17 DuPont, Process Hazards Management, E.I. duPont deNemours and
Company Inc., fourth edition, revised 1984, Section 6.3.
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FAILURE PROBABILITY GRAPH

Figure 4
Dupont; Process Hazards Manual, 4th Edition, 1984, Section 9.9
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Figure 5
Dupont; Process Hazards Management Manual, 4th Edition, 1984, Section
9.95

39

Detecting and Compensating for Failures (FMEA)

It is necessary to know when a component fails and the potential
duration of failure. The shorter the duration of failure, the less

chance of a catastrophic event. Therefore, critical components in a
process should receive inspection priority or a frequent schedule for
testing or both. The duration of failure can be assumed to be at least

one-half the interval between inspections and/or tests.
It is not unusual in a given system for components to fail. In
many instances, emergency measures can be utilized or the equipment

designed to minimize the potential for failures. When reviewing
potential equipment failure, the committee should list compensation
provisions for each component failure and describe briefly the
resultant hazard potential attributable to each component failure.
Priorities for correction can be established through use of a guide
number. The guide number provides a scale by which the committee can
determine if a component failure is likely to occur and if the safety
-1
or less would
fictor should be enhanced. Any guide number of 10
indicate correction is warranted. The guide number can be obtained by

multiplying the numerical values corresponding to the probability of
failure (Table 3) and the Hazard Rating. The Hazard Rating is an
estimation of the degree of hazard resulting from the failure of each

component and is based on each component being considered to be in a
failed state. The rating system used by du Pont follows: 18

18 DuPont, Process Hazards Management, E.I. duPont deNemours and
Company (Inc.), fourth edition, revised 198', Section 6.3.
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Table 3 Categorization of Hazard Rating
Category
1

Degree of
Safety
Safe

Description

Hazard
Rating

The component cannot fail,
or if it does, it will

10

0

= 1

fail safe (cannot cause a
hazardous situation).

2

Marginal

Failure of the component
will occur without major
damage or personal injury.

10

3

Unsafe

Failure probably will
cause major damage and/or
personal injury.

10

4

Very
unsafe

1

2

= 10

= 100

Failure of the component
10 3 = 1000
will cause multiple
failures in the process;
the failures have serious
personal injury or property
loss consequences.

As an example: If a component with a hazard rating of 10

1

also had

an approximate probability of failure of 10 - 3 , the product of these two

numerical values would yield 10

-2 as a guide number and warrant

priority correction to be made safe.

Concurrent Component Failures (FMEA)

Consideration of only one component to protect a system from a
serious hazard is not considered practical since this would limit the

value of the Failure Mode and Effect Analysis. Consideration of
combinations of failures will provide the review committee with a more
realistic approach to evaluating all possible system failures. When

evaluating multiple component failures using FMEA, the committee
should:
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o Study the sketches, documented problem areas, and tabulations
systematically.
o Group all components that can present serious hazards if they
fail concurrently.

A sufficient amount of time for the evaluation should be allowed by
the committee to insure that all possible combinations of failure are
examined and any potential serious hazards have not been overlooked.
The FMEA analysis should be performed similarly for combinations as is
done for each single component.
Following identification of all possible component failures, a list
in order of priority of all components and component combinations whose
failure will produce a guide number of 10

-1

or greater must be recorded.

Recommendations should be submitted by the committee for all items that
appear on this list. The list should also contain recommendations for
continuing aspects of the operation without modification. If this

occurs, current control measures that are considered acceptable should
be noted.
Since Failure Mode and Effect Analysis is equipment-oriented, it

does not lend itself to the research environment where dynamic change
in discovery work is often experienced. FMEA techniques, however, can
be useful to the pharmaceutical researcher as well as the plant
chemist. Modifications to the FMEA technique can make it easily
adaptable to the discovery and development stages of new drug
compounds.
Fault Tree Analysis EFTA)

The Fault Tree Analysis Method was originated by H.A. Watson of
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Bell Laboratories in 1961 to evaluate the safety of the Minuteman
Launch Control System. Initially, it was suited to batch operations.
In the early 1970s, Powers and Thompkins presented an approach for

automatically generating fault trees and applied them to chemical
19
processes.
Since considerable effort is required in generating fault
trees, additional procedures were developed to minimize the effort of
generating and evaluating fault trees, yet retain the benefit of acute
examination. Because of the complexity of Fault Tree Analysis, its use
has been primarily limited to the aerospace industry and only recently
has its application been utilized in the chemical and pharmaceutical
industry. Some advantages and disadvantages of the FTA method are
noted below:

Advantages

1. Shows the relationship between certain component failures that can
lead to the undesired major event.
2. Aids in evaluating the combination of unfavorable events leading to
the undesired major event.
3. Identifies human errors that can lead to the undesired event, and

highlights the system's sensitivity to operator or maintenance
errors.
4. Evaluates actual incidents.
5. Makes use of quantitative calculations and combinations of

causative events to:
19 Fawcett and Wood, Safety and Accident Prevention in Chemical
Operations, Wiley Interscience, 2nd Edition, 1982, Chapter 35, p. 729.
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o determine the severity of loss rates (dollars/year) caused by
the undesired event.
o Predicts the probability of the undesired event's occurrence.
6. Allows for comparison of loss rates (dollars/year) of modified and
unmodified processes. These rates can be used for cost benefit
analysis.

Disadvantages

1.

Considerable effort and expense may be required for the analysis of

even relatively uncomplicated processes.
2. Fault trees can become very unwieldly and possibly unmanageable in
complicated systems.
3. Computerization may be required for construction and evaluation of

large fault trees.

Application of FTA and Developing Fault Trees

When conducting FTA, the undesired event for review must first be
identified. The results of previous process reviews in which the What
if? and Failure Mode and Effect methods were used can be used as the
basis for selecting the undesired event. The overall objective of the
FTA is to determine where the process could fail and how the personnel
involved in operations and maintenance could also fail and bring about
in undesired event. Therefore, personnel involved with constructing a
fault tree should be familiar with:
o the process equipment and procedures
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o control and emergency facilities

Following selection of the undesired event, a fault tree is
designed by setting down the undesired event at the top and determining
all possible sequences of events which can bring about failure. The
tree is constructed using logic symbols and the events are tiered in
descending order of occurrence. Each tier represents a branch of the
fault tree and should be examined independently of the other branches.
By constructing the tree with logic symbols, the events are quantified
and give an idea of what the greatest risks are and where changes
should be made to provide the greatest safety for the projected budget.
Symbols are used in creating a fault tree, typical symbols and their
meaning are shown below:

An operation where any of the inputs or
feeder events produce an output. This
gate is in a failed state if at least
one of its inputs is in the failed
state.
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"And" Gate

An operation where all of the combined
inputs or events must co-exist to
produce an output or event. This gate
is in the failed state only if all its
inputs are in their failed states
simultaneously.

"Inhibit" Gate

Indicates that the output event occurs
when the input event occurs and the
inhibit condition is satisfied.

"Delay" Gate

Indicates that the output event occurs
when the input event has occurred and
the specified delay time has expired.

14 6

Subevent

The rectangle describes the event that
is the output of a logic gate.

Basic Cause

The circle represents a component
failure or random fault event that
requires no further development.

Basic Cause

The diamond represents a system failure
that is not developed further.

Normal Operation

The house represents an event that is
normally expected to occur because of
design or normal operating conditions.
It should be shown if not obvious.
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Transfer

The triangle transfers an entire part of
the tree to another location on the tree
or to another page of a divided tree.

It is important to the analysis that the causes of each event be
direct and immediate causes and that the subevents that comprise the
downward steps be as small as possible so that failure events or
branches will not be missed.
Construction of the fault tree should continue until all members of
the committee are satisfied that they have identified all possible
events and subevents and the basic causes of each.
A completed fault tree will provide the review committee with
insight to the critical path or events having the greatest impact on

the top undesired event. Frequently, visual inspection of the
completed tree will show just where system improvements may be needed.
The sensitivity of the system to basic causes can also be assessed by

determining the degree of involvement of the basic causes in the
sequence of failures leading to the top event. In cases where a system
would require multiple causes to occur simultaneously to produce a
failure, the major event is probably not sensitive to any single cause
unless that single cause is determined to have an extremely high
occurrence. An example of a representative fault—tree structure is
provided in Figure 6 on the following page.
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Representative Fault Tree Structure

Figure 6
American Institute of Chemical Engineers, 1985
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Identification of for Inadequately Controlled Hazards by FTA

In addition to recognized hazards, previously unrecognized
inadequately controlled hazards often are identified through the FTA
method of analysis. In many processes, the hazards involved in
starting up or shutting down a process can be more serious than those
which could occur during the continuous phase of operation. Therefore,
it may be necessary to combine batch operations with the continuous
operation and develop a fault tree which addresses failure experience
during the start-up, shutdown, and continuous operation phases.
Where the major event is not sensitive to any single cause because
multiple causes must occur to produce a failure, an analysis to
determine what is cilled "critical failure paths" or "minimum cut sets"
of the system must be performed. Minimum cut sets are used as a short
cut method of analyzing the entire fault tree because events that occur
in the tree between basic causes and the top event have been removed.

20

A complete tabulation of minimum cut sets contains all the failure

modes for the system understudy. Minimum cut sets:
o point out the weakest links in the system
o show which failures must be repaired or prevented to avoid or
minimize occurrence of the top event.
Recommendations resulting from the Fault Tree Analysis method
should be practical and will include items such as:
o Installation of safety devices such as relief valves, rupture
disks, or interlocks.

20 DuPont, Process Hazards Management, E.I. duPont deNemours and
Company (Inc.), fourth edition, revised 1984, section 7.4.
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o Improved design features such as fail—safe components, redundant
sensors or controls, or warning devices such as alarm lights or
horns.
o Special procedures such as use of operational checklists or

entry of process conditions on log sheets.

A procedure for obtaining critical combinations of failures
(minimum cut sets) and ranking of basic causes, plus fault tree
construction rules as developed by DuPont Inc. are provided on the
following two pages.
As can be seen from this description of the Fault Tree Analysis

method, it is a very rigorous method and quite involved, to the point
where computerization may be necessary to quantify the various
identified causes. Because of this, the FTA technique has been better

suited to production sites rather than the research environment where
less rigorous methods are better suited and preferred.

Procedure for Obtaining Critical Combinations

of Failures (Minimum Cut Sets) and Ranking of Basic Cause

Determining the Critical Failure Combinations (Minimum Cut Sets)

1. Identify each gate in the fault tree with a letter

and a basic

cause in the tree with a number.
2. Develop a Boolean Indicated Cut Sets (BICS) table as follows:
a. Start the table by listing the top gate of the tree in the
first vertical column of the first horizontal row.
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b.

Based on the type of gate, make the following substitutions and

additions to the table:

o

If the gate is an AND gate, replace it with one of its
input elements and place its remaining input elements in
vacant columns in the same horizontal row.

o

If the gate is an OR gate, use one of its input elements to
replace the gate. Place each of its other input elements
in the same vertical column in the next vacant row and copy

all other elements in the row where the gate was replaced
into the new row(s) in their respective columns.

c. Repeat this procedure until the BICS table contains only basic
cause events represented by numbers.

3. Reduce the BICS table of minimum cut sets.

a. Delete from the BICS table any duplicate rows or any duplicate
number (basic cause events) within any row.

b.

Delete from the modified BICS table any row that includes
within it all the numbers (basic cause events) that are given
in any other shorter row.
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Suggested Fault Tree Construction Steps 21

1. Identify the top event.

2. Understand the process.

3.

Develop the tree structure by showing direct causes.

4. Specify the event state. Be specific about the occurrence and any
other components involved.

5. Follow the signal path backward:

Work from the control component (such as a valve) back through

o

the signal path to the detection component.
o

Assess failures at each component en route.

6. Evaluate each type of failure for each component:

o

Mechanical (internal).

o

Command (faulty signal).

o

External (fire, freeze air loss).

7. Use cut sets to evaluate trees with common mode failures.

21

DuPont, Process Hazard Management, E.I. duPont de Nemours and CO.

(Inc.), Fourth Edition, Revised 1984, section 7.13.
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Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP)

The basic concept of Hazard and Operability Studies is to identify
hazards before an incident and control the risks. The technique aims
to stimulate the imagination of designers in a systematic way so that

hazards can be identified in the design phase. HAZOP is a flexible
technique and can be applied to all types of plants in industry ranging
from large continuous operations, through small batch units to
individual proprietary items of equipment such as autoclaves or
micronizer mills.
A distinguishing feature of HAZOP is the "Examination Session"
during which a multi-disciplinary team systematically examines all
relevant parts of a design using a structured but creative approach.

22

HAZOP, due to it flexibility, is particulary adaptable to innovative

process work and new technology where other methods such as FTA have
proven to be overly complex or limiting. Additional notable features
of HAZOP study include:
o It is based on brainstorming.
o It is structured by using guide words.
o It is cost effective.
In comparison to traditional methods such as the What if? or

checklist, HAZOP reduces the chance that something will be missed and
addresses situations for which the solutions are not always obvious.

22 Chemical Industries Association Ltd., ICI Central Safety Deprtment,
Shell Chemical (UK) Ltd., "Guide to Hazard and Operability Studies",
Notes on Presentation, p. 2.
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While

traditional

methods

are

experience-based,

procedural

(prescriptive) and collective, HAZOP studies are very systematic,
creative, informative, and participant interactive.

Conducting a HAZOP Study

The approach to identifying operating problems and hazards by this
method is to search for deviations from the original design intent. It
is especially stressed that in a hazard and operability study, the
operability part is as important as the hazard part. There are
tendencies in some studies to identify more operating problems than
potential hazards.

The initial step in setting up a HAZOP study is to provide
sufficient time, expertise and available information. Next, a
multi-disciplinary team is formed. The team will consist of two types
of team members, namely those who will make a technical contribution

and those who will play a supporting and structuring role. Technical
team membership should include members that have a detailed knowledge
of the way the plant is intended to work and a blend of those concerned
with the design and operation of the plant. A team should contain
enough people with sufficient knowledge and experience to answer the
majority of questions without recourse to further expertise. A
technical team would, therefore, be comprised of such participants as:
Mechanical Engineer

Chemical Engineer
R&D Chemist

Production Manager
Project Manager responsible for

the project

Supporting team members are utilized to control the discussion, the
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major supporting team member normally is identified as the team leader.
The team leader will help whomever has commissioned the study to define
the scope and may also assist with selection and training of the team
members. The major role of the team leader, however, is to guide the
systematic questioning and not to be responsible for a major technical
contribution.
In addition to the study leader, it is sometimes useful to have a

further supporting member to act as a secretary or scribe to make note
of the hazards as they are detected.

HAZOP Terminology

Because the examination will be systematic and structured, it is

necessary for participants to use certain terms in a precise and
disciplined way. Some necessary definitions to be understood before
conducting a HAZOP study are:

Intention

- defines what is expected and how the part is
expected to operate.

Deviation

- describes departures from the intention and
systematically questions how deviations can occur
by applying guide words.

Causes

- reasons why the deviations may occur.

Consequences - results of the deviations should they occur.

Hazards

- consequences which can cause damage, injury or
loss.
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Specific guide words are also used to assist in discovering and
qualifying potential deviations from the intention. A list of guide

words used is given below.

Guide Words
Guide Word

No or Not

Meaning

Examples

No part of the intention is

No flow, no

achieved but nothing else happens.

agitation, no

reaction.
More

Quantitative increase or

More flow, more

Less

decrease to the intended activity.

pressure, lower
temperature,

less

time.
As Well As

All of the intention is achieved

Additional

but some additional activity occurs.

component, containment, extra
phase.

Part of

Only part of the intention is

Component omitted,

achieved, part is not.

part of multiple
destination omitted.

Reverse

The opposite of the intention occurs. Reverse flow,
reverse order or
addition.

Other than

No part of the intention is achieved. Wrong component,
Something different happens.

start—up, shut—down,
utility failure.
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By means of the terms and guide words, the process variables or
specific parameters of interest are examined by the team and specific
deviations detected and addressed as to the probable causes and
consequences. In a continuous chemical process for example, process
variables would include temperature, pressure, flow, and concentration.
These specialized guide words would be used in conducting the study and
would be listed as follows:
Guide Word

Variable

Deviation

No

Flow

No flow

Less

Temperature

Low temperature

More

Pressure

High pressure

Part of

Concentration

Low concentration

For batch processes, level, reactivity, and time might be
additional parameters considered. For something more specific such as
an electrical system, voltage, current, phase, and frequency would be
variables that are considered.

When the guide words are applied correctly, a series of important
questions will develop about a specific parameter or other parameters
of the system. For instance, use of the guide word "no" with the
variable word "flow" means "no flow" will occur when possibly there
should be flow. As a result, we could ask the following questions

regarding the operation and hazards for this aspect of the system.
o Could there be no flow?
o If so, how could it happen?
o What are the consequences of no flow?
o Are the consequences hazardous or do they prevent efficient
operation?
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o If so, can we prevent no flow (or protect against the
consequences) by changing the design or operating method?
o If so, does the size of the hazard or problem justify the extra

expense?

Additional guide words would be applied as required. To reduce the
chance that something will be missed, the guide words should be carried
out for any operation that is expected to take place in the equipment

being evaluated.

Outcomes of Guide Word Application

One of three outcomes is possible for each guide word application:

1.

No hazard or problem exists.

2. A hazard or problem exists. In this case, a suitable record is
made to that effect, and the solution will have to be resolved

outside the meetings.
3. The team does not have sufficient information to determine
whether a problem exists. In this case, a record is made to

that effect, and again, the necessary information will have to
be found outside the meeting.

HAZOP Flexibility and Benefits

HAZOP's major contribution is that potential process problems are
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identified in advance of them becoming a major incident or disaster.

23

HAZOP analysis is also advantageous because:
o Potential problems are identified and resolved relatively
easily, and most subtle hazards are identified at the design
stage.
o Potential problems can be resolved rationally, whereas an
incident usually creates an overreaction and expensive,
ultraconservative solutions.
o Engineering change orders during construction and commissioning
are drastically reduced.
o Plant design and start—up is more timely.
Because the methodology is basically very simple and the guide
words are general, HAZOP can be applied to many different types of
systems such as:
o Continuous chemical and petrochemical processes.
o Batch organics,

specialty

chemicals

and

pharmaceutical

processes.
o Pilot plants.
o Bench research processes.
o Molecular genetics research laboratories.
o Manufacturing processes.

Since HAZOP is very flexible, the review team should also try to

23

Gibson, S.B. and Shafagi, "Hazard and Operability Study: A Flexible
Technique for Process System Safety and Reliability Analysis", The
Chemical Process Review, ACS Symposium Series 274, American Chemical
Society, 1985, page 37.
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avoid the pitfall of getting overly enthusiastic and installing
expensive equipment to guard against unlikely hazards. HAZOP is a
sophisticated technique that should also be used by a company to help
utilize its resources more effectively. The method which has been

simplified and graphically outlined by Shafagi and Gibson is shown
below in Figure 7.

24

HAZOP Method Flow Diagram

24 Gibson, S.B. and Shafagi, "Hazard and Operatiblity HAZOP) Study; A
Flexible Technique for Process System Safety and Reliability Analysis",
187th National Meeting, St. Louis, Missouri, April 21-23, 1984, page 6.
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Additional Analysis Considerations

Two other techniques are noteworthy of mention in addition to the
methods which have just been outlined. An information gathering
technique known as "incident recall" or "critical incident techniques"
can be used to collect both poor and good experience data from
experienced personnel. It requires asking people to share
difficulties, errors, near misses, accidents, successes etc. they
remember in past similar operations and conditions.
This method can generate a greater quantity of relevant and useful
information more so than any other monitoring technique. It also can
uncover many more minor errors, deficiencies and near misses that
otherwise might have been overlooked. The method relates to the
familiar Heinrich triangle(42) which predicts that there are many near
misses for every accident.
A second technique known as Management Oversight and Risk Tree
Analysis (MORT) was developed in the early 1980s and is an even more
sophisticated program for managing safety systematically, using logic
trees. It is currently used for major government projects in the
Department of Energy and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for project
review and start-up and in the investigation of serious accidents. The
technique is complex because it not only includes the technical aspects
of fault tree analysis but includes logic trees for the deductive
analysis of managerial functions, human behavioral factors, and
environmental considerations. It can also be cost prohibitive,
therefore, only large complex projects that could result in serious
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consequences, if failure resulted, can afford to be analyzed by MORT.

25

Summary of Analysis Methods

The methods and techniques discussed were developed in response to
the need for more and better information about chemical and
pharmaceutical processes in order to make them safer, more efficient,
and commensurate with the safety expectations of both the public and
regulitory agencies.
When the techniques described are used, it is assumed that
management is competent, and the plant or research lab will be operated
and maintained in accordance with good management and engineering
practices. If this is not true, then time spent identifying hazards by
the methods described will be wasted since no one will be interested in
doing anything about them.
Where process hazard reviews have not been used by an organization
before, they should be introduced on a small scale. Reviews should be
applied to one or two cases initially and hopefully management will
find that the reviews are very useful and ask for more and the use of
the techniques will grow.
Hazard evaluation methods will also need to be responsive to the
needs of industry. As technology and science moves forward, many new
materials and drug compounds of increased potency and physiological
properties will be developed. The technology necessary to produce
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these products will become increasingly more complex and require hazard

evaluation programs of equal sophistication and creativity.
With dynamic change an accepted reality in today's pharmaceutical
industry, process development has a tendency to be more of a philosophy

than an exact program. Due to the constantly changing nature of this
industry, technical management must be constantly on guard for the
unexpected and unknown. Suitable process review programs for the

pharmaceutical industry should then be flexible as well as structured
and become a well integrated part of the research, development, and

manufacturing activity of new drug compounds and drug safety programs.

CHAPTER III

THE REGULATED ASPECTS OF DRUG DEVELOPMENT SAFETY

Drug Testing

Finding out if a new drug works to those not involved in the
technical development of drug products might appear very simple. A
sick patient is administered a new drug by a doctor; if the patient

gets better, the drug works; if the patient fails to improve, the drug
does not work.
Unfortunately, this procedure can yield nothing but confusion and
pitfalls. A strict testing protocol is therefore warranted and thanks
to delicate and ingenious testing methods, it is possible to determine
that new drugs are safe and effective - if not for 100% of the people
100% of the time, at least for most people most of the time.
The testing of modern day drugs for safety requires the
accumulated knowledge of half a dozen scientific disciplines; not
merely chemistry and pharmacology but also physiology (of man and many
other animals), psychology (because drugs can effect the body through
the mind as well as directly in the body), and even mathematics (for an
indication of the role that chance plays in the test results).

Evaluation of one new drug may take up to seven years - trying it on
severil different species of animals, administering it to several large
groups of people, and analyzing the findings - before finally
convincing governmental authorities that the drug should be approved
for medical use.
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Two unseen ingredients are part of the making of every drug. One

is research; the other is testing. Over the past four decades, large
pharmaceutical corporations have planned multi—million dollar budgets
in an effort to discover and develop new medications. Of the drugs
most often prescribed today, many were not even in existence a decade
ago.
Drug research begins with the discovery and subsequent isolation
and identification of likely materials. Few chemicals remain untried.
Even old drugs are re—examined and the subject of intensive research.
For if they can be isolated and reproduced in the laboratory, the drug
may be improved. With the advent of synthetic drugs, manufacturers are
no longer committed to dependence on natural supplies. More important,
synthetic drug manufacturing offers the opportunity to provide
consistent quality and simplification of production tests that will
guarantee uniform products.
Even long after a drug has been discovered, developed, accepted
for medical use and marketed, its testing continues. At every stage of
manufacture, there are continuous inspections to check whether the
compound meets specifications and if prolonged and widespread use may

turn up effects that no testing programs, even if it included thousands
of subjects and lasted several years, could predict. Quality control
testing of drug compounds may involve more than 100 tests, some as
simple as the measurement of a tablet thickness and weight, others as
complex as delicate analysis of chemical ingredients, still others as
elaborate as the precautions taken to ensure the purity of the water
used in the manufacturing processes.
The strictest of the tests cover the biologicals, such as
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vaccines, and most antibiotics, which cannot be synthesized but must be
obtained from living microorganisms. The quality control process does
not end when a drug leaves the plant since manufacturers periodically
collect shelf samples to test for deterioration.
Under current U.S. regulations, every new drug must be tested on
at least two species of mammal [before being given to human beings].
The animals are tested in groups, to obtain various types of
information. One group will receive large quantities of drug in order
to ascertain how much of a dose will prove fatal. Another group will
be given smaller doses - proportional to the dose that is expected to
be medically useful in man - then there will be studies over a period
of months to determine long-term damage. Ultimately, the animals are
killed and their vital organs examined for subtler signs of damage.
New drug compounds are also administered to young animals to ascertain
whether it affects their growth. Other tests include the determination
of the carcinogenic, terotogenic, and mutagenic properties of the drug.
When the animal testing is completed, the tests must be reviewed
and a decision made as to how the animal data findings apply to human
beings. In the case of bacterial infections, microbes that attack
human beings will usually attack other species and a drug that cures
the infection in an animal provides hope for a cure in humans.
Human testing generally begins with a small group of healthy

volunteers. The small group known as a "preclinical" group receives
very limited doses of the drug initially. If there are no negative

responses, the dose is gradually increased until there is a positive
effect or result. When the subject begins to show toxic effects, the
dosage level is cut back. In the meantime, the physical condition of
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the volunteers is studied exhaustively.
At this point, the testers concern is still with the drug's safety
rather than its effectiveness. The aim is to determine the "dose
response curve" which shows the effect of the drug changes with the
amount administered. The variability of dose response affect in humans
is an important factor to be aware of in new drugs because in some
extreme cases, an identical dose of a drug can cure one individual,
poison another and leave the third unaffected. Only after the drug has
been proven safe for humans does it come to the crucial part of
testing: the study of effectiveness. Will the new compound help the
disease for which it was intended?
Legislative and regulatory control over drugs have evolved
parallel to, although somewhat behind, developments in medical and
pharmaceutical sciences over the past century. Controls have crept
from purity to safety and, more recently, to concern for the efficacy
of drugs and to their manner of use. The controls frequently utilized
have impacted the following: (1) labeling, (2) advertising, (3) drug
shipments in interstate commerce, (4) investigational plans - good
clinical practices (GCP), and (5) good manufacturing practices (GMP),
and good laboratory practices (GLP) which have helped to eliminate
unscrupulous manufacturers and developers.

26

The thrust of the U.S. Food and Drug Act and similar laws in other
countries is that a drug must be safe and effective for use in
medicine. The purpose of phamacological testing is to measure
effectiveness, safety, and relative freedom from unwanted side effects
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Hamner, Charles E., Drug Development, CRC Press, Third Printing,
1985, page 2.
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including carcinogencity and teratogenicity. In developing a new drug,
continued evaluation of test data must be done to identify problem
areas early. "Safety" is defined as the limits within which a compound
is expected to hive a beneficial effect with the lowest possible
risk.(44) Those limits must be continually examined, and the risks

must be evaluated and assigned a degree of hazard. Assessing hazard is
difficult because it involves risk benefit analysis. Factors suitable
for assessing the hazards of a drug are entirely different from those
used to evaluate a pesticide, food additives, or an industrial
chemical, for the simple reason that a drug is intentionally taken for

a specific purpose, the exposure is strictly defined, and the person is
awire of the exposure. Usually, there is competent supervision of the
administration of a drug, so that the risks of serious injury are
significantly reduced.

Establishing the Pharmacological Profile

As progress in the pharmacological development of a new compound
occurs, there is an accumulation of information from the series oftests

on numerous animal models. The results of these studies outline a
pharmacological profile to enable insight into the therapeutic range

and comparative toxicity of the compound under evaluation.
As a body of information develops on a new compound through study
of the animal models, a clearer outline of its therapeutic profile
takes shape. Included in the data profile are assessment of activity
and toxicity as compared to standard therapy, mechanisms of action,
dose response curves, and metabolic fate. As the data develops, it
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adds to the understanding of the new drug compound. Although definite
decisions cannot be made without sufficient data, judgment is required
to decide what particular additional information, if any, would be
helpful, what data would be of interest, and what findings may or may
not be delayed to a later date. The purpose of this effort is to make
decisions concerning the progress of the compound in question and to
determine whether or not to proceed.
During this process of new drug development, data has been
developed under regulatory guidelines, determined by the FDA. For
example, Good Laboratory Practices (GLP) regulations are presently in
place throughout pharmaceutical laboratories in the country and a

number of research facilities abroad. The data developed under these
regulations become part of the official regulatory document.
If the compound is still worthy of development, planning

considerations for evaluating the compound in the clinic need to be
considered at this time. Regulatory affairs, as well as Occupational
Heilth and Safety personnel should be alerted about possible plans for
the drug, if it is to proceed to the clinic. Advance notice to

regulatory and health and Safety personnel will be of great assistance
in hearing them plan their contribution. A combined effort with

program coordination will ensure that proper information will be
available for regulatory submission and use in plant process reviews.
Practical concerns should also be considered when a compound is
viewed as a candidate for clinical evaluation. For example, is it

necessary to consider the ease and economy of the chemical synthesis or
the need to conduct further toxicological evaluations, to determine the
extent and type of undesirable side effects.
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The value of avoiding toxic effects on new chemical agents is
essential to both the therapeutic and manufacturing success of the drug
compound. Once preclinical data is considered favorable, and the
toxicity of the compound acceptable, early drug evaluation or clinical
trials in humans can be commenced.

Drug Application Requirements

Clinical trials for new drug compounds are conducted under the

watchful eye of government regulators through investigational new drug
requirements called an IND, "Notice of Claimed Investigation Exemption
for a New Drug" and the NDA or New Drug Application. The IND is
relatively new in the area of government drug regulation and originated
because the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938 prohibited shipment of
a new drug in interstate commerce without an approved New Drug

Application (NDA). This act, however, was concerned only with safety
and thus presented no tactical problem. In June of 1963, amendments to
the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act by Kefauver—Harris, addressed the issue
of efficacy and changed the procedures by requiring clinical evaluation
to estiblish that the new drug product was both safe and effective.

27

To comply, provisions were made to ship unapproved drug to clinical
investigators for necessary evaluation; the IND was the result of this
action. The application is technically an exemption to ship the
unapproved drug; however, such a notice must be filed with the FDA
prior to clinical testing in the U.S. The information provided in the
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application summarizes available data on the drug and is the basis for
the proposed clinical evaluations. An IND may be filed by a
pharmaceutical company, an individual, or an institution, referred to
as a sponsor.
An IND is not approved, but the sponsor must wait a minimum of 30
days after submitting the application before initiating clinical
studies. This permits reviewers to examine the submission and ask
questions regarding any part of the application. The drug may not be
administered to humans until adequate data are provided to satisfy the
FDA. While an IND is not approved, it can be disapproved or terminated
if, in the eyes of the reviewer, it presents a hazard to health that
clearly outweighs anticipated clinical benefits.

The New Drug Application (NDA)

When the safety and efficacy of the investigational drug have been
established, the sponsor is required to file a New Drug Application
(NDA), or give reasons why a NDA has not been submitted. The
alternative is to advise the FDA that the exemption has been
discontinued with the reasons for such action specified. The
requirement to file based on the above precludes continued distribution

of the drug.

28

The NDA procedure was devised in 1938 as a mechanism by which new
drugs developed through research could be introduced commercially. The

procedure was necessary because new drugs by their very nature, could

28 Hamner, Charles, E. "Drug Development", CRC Press, Third Printing,
1985, page 110.
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not be generally recognized as safe.

Therefore, documentation of

safety became a central component of the NDA.
The drug amendments of 1963 added the dimension of effectiveness
to the requirements that must be met before a new drug is marketed.

NDA-Evaluations of Safety and Effectiveness

As part of the New Drug Application (NDA) a specific section is
provided which calls for a separate summary of all favorable and
unfavorable evidence of each claim proposed in the labeling of the
product. The evaluation provides the applicant with the opportunity to
identify the specific data that supports his conclusion that the drug
should be approved for marketing. This section should contain and cite
the positive data by study, volume, and page that constitute
substantial evidence of safety and effectiveness. Likewise, a similar
summary of the unfavorable evidence for each proposed claim is called
for in the section. All side effects or adverse experience whether or
not considered to be significant should also be tabulated.
The information required in this section in effect then becomes
similar to a Chemical Safety Data Sheet which provides the user
valuable information about the proper use and handling of hazardous
materials. On approved drugs, safety information is required to be
included on the package insert which must meet rigid general
requirements.
The package insert is a digest of the pertinent scientific and
medical information about the drug revealed during the R&D process.
This document serves as a regulatory basis for all labeling and
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advertising and is a summary of the essential information that a
physician needs in order to use the drug safely and effectively for the
purpose intended. Labels and labeling are usually included in the
initial NDA in order to give the FDA an opportunity to review the
proposed content and wording and ultimately gain approval by the
sponsor.
The above has provided a brief look at some aspects of drug safety
which are monitored by governmental agencies in order to guarantee that
a new drug reaching the commercial market will have a high degree of
safety when used by the public at the recommended therapeutic dosages.
We must, however, recognize that a responsible new product development
program applies to all phases of the product life cycle from research,
development and design through manufacturing, purchasing,
sales/marketing, distribution and customer service. Each function and
discipline involved in the phases of the product life cycle must have
key roles in assuring that new products developed by the company can be
manufactured and used safely.
For this reason, in new drug development the evaluation of safety
may be implied to take on a different meaning than say the assessment
of an environmental contaminant or an explosion hazard. Safety
philosophy with respect to drug compounds is often thought of with
respect to "conditions to use" rather than in the processing of the

drug material. It must be remembered that a drug is selected for its
ability to alter a physiologic function, and is usually biologically
active. Under conditions of use, limits can be defined, such as dosage

level, nutritional requirements or routes of administration, within
which the drug is considered to be safe and a benefit to mankind.
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Alternatively, where workers are excessively and unintentionally
exposed to them, drug compounds can result in undesirable health
effects. Therefore, not only evaluations of clinical exposure to new
drugs should be performed, but also occupational exposures and hazards
related to the processing and manufacturing of a new drug product.
In the following chapter, a description of operations involved in
the production of pharmaceuticals is presented. The purpose of this is

to provide some insight into the potential health risks encountered
during processing of drug compounds versus those physical risks already
established by the general physical characteristics of the raw
materials used to synthesize a new drug product.

CHAPTER IV

PHARMACEUTICAL PROCESSING AND ASSOCIATED HAZARDS

Introduction

Understanding of the risk associated with a substance or operation
can often determine how to work with it. If it is flammable or
explosive, specialized equipment may be needed. If it is a gas or
dust, there is a potential for exposure, and an understanding of the
material's toxicity and the operations needed to process it may be

essential to the engineer designing the plant, as well as the operator
and safety professional who will work in the plant.

The need to understand the hazardous characteristics and toxicity
of a new compound also depends on the stage of development a substance
is in - if it is purely an exploratory material and its use carefully

controlled, only limited information may be necessary. As progress is
made toward the pilot plant production stage, understanding of

associated risks will need to be increased. By the time the
manufacturing and commercialization stage is reached, a maximum amount
of information will be necessary to control risks associated with the

process.
The following describes the operations involved in the production
of pharmaceuticals and the availability and the use of controls to

reduce potential hazards and risk. The major emphasis is placed on
process development and manufacturing.
Process development involves the typical steps of development and
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testing of products in the laboratory, design and evaluation of
production processes in small-scale pilot plant operations, and the
subsequent scale-up, design and start-up of a full scale plant. The
processes and operations involved are by no means unique to the
pharmaceutical industry. For example, laboratory operations are
usually typical of those conducted in chemical and biological labs.
The operation conducted in the pilot plant phase of development and in
the start-up of full scale operations are generally characteristic of
those also found in the chemical industry. Included in these are
evaporation, distillation, absorption,

esterification,

nitration,

hydrogenation and many others.
Many of the hazard evaluation procedures that are used most
frequently by the chemical process industry for identifying deviations
from good practice can be used for drug compounds being developed in
the laboratory and pilot plant stages. It is in the manufacturing of
pharmaceuticals that a somewhat different type of operation or
equipment unique to the pharmaceutical industry is found. These
operations, due to the biological activity of the material produced at
this point, present unique concerns that should be addressed in a
formalized hazard review before manufacturing begins. As with many
other industries, the recognition and appreciation of hazards rising

from physical and toxic agents have resulted in reductions, and even
eliminations of such hazards in the pharmaceutical industry. One can
even consider that the present, somewhat dual regulation of the
industry by the Food and Drug Administration and OSHA, has provided the
impetus to control operations to an even larger degree. It must also
be recognized that in the pharmaceutical industry there is an ever
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increasing variety of potentially toxic exposures due to the rapid
advancement in the life sciences (Biotechnology) and the advent of new
chemical substances. It is essential then, that sufficient knowledge

of the hazards connected with all processes involved in the
manufacturing and processing of a new drug compound be addressed.

Chemical Processing

The processes and operations which can be termed as "chemical

processes" are numerous and varied in nature. It is not surprising
then that many of the chemical substances used to synthesize
pharmaceutical compounds may also be substances of concern when it
comes to the health and safety of the process worker.
The concern is developed by the fact that processes in the

chemical industry involve chemical or physical change, particularly
with respect to the chemical structure and composition of the
substances. It applies not only to the chemical industry but to a much
wider field which includes such principal products as fertilizers,
dyestuffs, pharmaceuticals and medicinal products, explosives,
plastics, resins, adhesives, cosmetics, synthetic fibers, detergents,
soap, paints and a myriad of miscellaneous chemicals.
Chemical processes encompass a number of operations among which
are crushing, grinding, size separation, filtration, drying, heating,
cooling, solvent extraction, absorption, distillation, fractionation,
electrolysis, mixing, blending, analysis and process control, packaging
and transport. As is evident, this list comprises most of the
operations utilized in any of the manufacturing industries and much of
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the pharmaceutical industry.
If we look at equipment types which are more specific to the
actual manufacture of raw materials or intermediates from which
industry manufactures its final products, then materials handling and
grinding, crushing, and screening equipment for solids can be excluded
from equipment or process systems which cause the contacting, reaction,
or separation of gases and/or liquids. If we also consider that
chemical process companies involved with the manufacture of large
volumes of chemicals utilize "closed" systems, i.e. where the chemicals

are not blatantly open to the atmosphere, then it can be practically
assumed that the potential for the occurrence of an undesirable event
to occur would be primarily due to:
1.

Loss of containment of flammable, combustible, highly

reactive, or highly toxic material sufficient to seriously
endanger the health and safety of the plant employees and
neighboring public.
2. Intentional releases of contaminant from system component
vents.
3. Atmospheric releases from combustion processes.
4.

Accidental or unintentional releases due to equipment failure
or malfunction.

Hazards occurring due to the loss of containment or contaminant
release can often be traced to specific equipment and practices
involving the use of valves, conservation tank and process vents,
relief valves and disks. Many of the above valves can leak
continuously even when supposedly shut, causing the leaks to build up

and exposure or explosivity limits to be exceeded. Practices involving
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the routine releasing of purges, minor overpressures and system
breathing to atmosphere should be subject to recycle collection,
scrubbing, or other measures, all of which will reduce or eliminate
release.
Prevention of releases of large volumes of contaminant can also be
prevented through the use of collection systems. Flares are used to
control fume releases, but this is not a simple task because the system
must be designed to handle a wide variety of operating conditions,
including the possibility of simultaneous release of several streams.
Rupture disks which are used to control overpressure situations
and prevent reactor explosions are generally capable of ensuring a
secure seal until they relieve. However, they must be properly
installed and properly rated for the condition they were designed to
protect. Rupture disks can also be used in-line preceding a relief
valve to protect the valve until an overpressure condition becomes
imminent.
Other sources of contaminant release which can result in an
elevated risk condition include:
1. Vapor losses from tank vents and process vents during normal
venting practices and during chemical loading operations.
2.

Compression packings around the shaft, rod or plunger in
pumps. Lubrication for proper operation is provided by the

fluid being handled as it flows through the slight clearance
between moving parts and the packing.

Such leakage it if

reaches an undesired leakage rate would increase contaminant
concentrations.
3. Leakage from valves and flanges which are subject to crevice
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corrosion, leakage from screwed joints and gasket failure also
are a source of contaminant release and increase the
possibility of fire and explosion hazards.
Typical solutions to reducing exposures and hazards associated
with the above would be tightening of flanges, the use of welded or
flanged couplings instead of "leak-proof" threaded couplings,
investigation of better gasket materials and pump seals, the use of
larger capacity equipment and process changes to reduce the frequency
of cleaning operations.

Drying Ovens

Drying can be defined as "the removal of a liquid from a solid by
external means".

29

Oven drying equipment is classified into three

category types and depends on the transfer of heat to the material
being dried. The first category includes direct dryers in which gases
are in direct contact with the material, and carry away any vaporized
substances to be exhausted. Direct drying equipment can be
subcategorized with regard to their operating mode such as continuous

or batch. Continuous drying is accomplished in equipment such as tray
dryers which function by circulating heated air across a wet material
until sufficient drying has occurred or spray dryers where the material
to be dried is atomized and spray droplets are formed and exposed to an
upward flow of heated iir. Because the surface area-to-volume ratio of
the material in droplet form is quite large, drying is accomplished
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Perry, R.H., and Chilton, C.H., Chemical Engineers Handbook, 5th
Edition, McGraw-Hill Book Co., New York, 1973.
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very rapidly.
Batch drying equipment falls basically into two categories,
through circulation type, in which the material is positioned on
stationary trays through which hot air is forced and compartment dryers
which support material on trays across which hot air is passed. A
uniform flow into all parts of the tray chamber is essential because
the material to be dried remains stationary.
The second type is called an indirect dryer in which the drying
heat is transferred to the moist solid through a conducting wall. In
this type of dryer, any vaporized substance is removed independently of
the heated air. There are four types of indirect drying equipment
which are of interest; the agitated pan dryer, the vacuum rotary dryer,
the vacuum try dryer, and the freeze dryer. Agitated pan dryers
incorporate the use of a circular tray which is steam heated from
underneath while the material is agitated to keep fresh material in
contact with the heated pan. Vacuum pan dryers consist of a chamber
containing shelves. The shelves are designed so that they can be
heated. Conduction of the heta occurs between the shelves and metal
trays in which the material is placed. The application of vacuum makes
it possible to do lower temperature drying and solvent vapor recovery.
Freeze drying takes advantage of the process whereby frozen solvent is
removed by sublimation. This equipment can be of the shelf type,
cylindrical vessel, or horizontal rotary vacuum design.
Radiant-heat and dielectric heat dryers fall into the third dryer
category. The operation of the former is based on the generation,
trinsmission, and absorbtion of infra-red rays. The latter relies on
heat generation within the solid when it is placed in a high frequency
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electric field.
Control of employee exposures to contaminants from drying ovens is
a legitimate concern in pharmaceutical drug development. The ACGIH
Industrial Ventilation Manuil 30 contains criteria for the control of
employee exposures to contaminants from ovens and recommends:
1. A slot type hood located around the top portion of the
entrance or exit doors and a canopy type which is also
installed over the doors.
2. For the slot hood, an exhaust volume of 100 cfm per square
foot of door area plus one half the product of combustion.
3. For the canopy, the recommended rate is 200 cfm per square
foot of hood face plus the same correction for combustion
products.
Oven dryer operations also come under concern in the National Fire
Codes.

31

The codes address the need for ventilation of ovens and

furnaces to control flammable or toxic vapors. Batch process ovens are
reported to usually require a minimum of 320 cfm per gallon of solvent
present.
Although oven ventilation systems design is intended to
control and carry away contaminants, fumes and vapors often can find
their way into the working environment through inlet and outlet
openings and opened doors in batch ovens. Ventilation system designs
should include local exhaust hoods at inlet and outlet openings and at

30

Industrial Ventilation:
A Manual of Recommended Practices, 13th
Edition, Committee on Industrial Ventilation, American Conference of
Governmental Industrial Hygienists, Lansing, Michigan, 1974, page 2-4.
31
National Fire Codes, Vol. 8, 86A, National Fire Protection
Association, Boston, Mass. 1975.
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batch oven doors to prevent release to the general atmosphere.
With regard to safety, there are two very important reasons for
controlling the environment in and around a drying oven. The first is

the maintenance of a low concentration of flammable solvent vapor to
eliminate the possibility of fire or explosion. The second is to
ensure that toxic contaminants are not released into the breathing zone
of workers. Oven design and usage, therefore, must be given serious
considerition during any process review to insure effective control of
hazardous materials and a safe operation.

Grinding, Crushing and Screening

Many industries, especially the pharmaceutical industry utilize
grinding, crushing, and screening equipment to obtain size reduction or
dispersion of solids or pastes. Use of this equipment necessitates the
control of dust or vapor emissions to prevent potential fire or

explosion and exposure of workers to toxic contaminants released during
operition of the equipment.

Crushing and Grinding

Size reduction involves the mechanical reduction in size of solid
material. Crushing and grinding represent two methods of achieving
that reduction, but the terms do not represent the same operation.
Crushing generally refers to a relatively slow compressive action while

grinding involves an attrition or rubbing action as well as interaction
between individual pieces of material. Pulverizing and disintegration
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are terms related to grinding. Pulverizing usually applies to an
operation in which a fine powder is produced, grinding refers to the
breakdown of relatively weak bonds holding solids together, such as
those present in caked powders. There are many types of equipment
designed to perform the above operations. Some of those used in the
pharmaceutical industry are:
1. Hammer crushers or mills — used for crushing or pulverizing.
Hammers mounted to a rotor shaft run inside a housing that
contains grinding plates.

The rotor is enclosed by a

cylindrical screen or grating through which the product is
removed.
2. Roller mills — used to process powders and pastes. Here the
substance is passed through closely spaced rollers which

revolve at different speeds and in opposite directions to
effect some degree of dispersion and/or size reduction.
3. Tumble mills — consists of a horizontally—mounted chamber
containing a loose packing or grinding medium which moves
about the grinding charge to provide the necessary impaction

and attrition. The media can be balls, tubes, rods or
pebbles.

Screening

Once the size of the material has been reduced, it is often
necessary to assure size uniformity. This can be accomplished through
several techniques such as screening, centrifugal classification,
pneumatic classification and aqueous classification. Screening is the
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most commonly used method.
Screening involves the mechanical separation of particles on the
basis of size, and is also known as sizing, sifting, sieving, or
separation. Screening surfaces are usually moved or vibrated to
facilitate material flow.
Use of screening equipment can produce hazardous dust exposures
involving the release of small particles easily suspended in air. These
particles can be released to the plant environment if proper controls
are not utilized. Where organic solvents are used in paste or ointment
formulations, solvent vapors may also be evolved. When flammable
solvents are used as the vehicle for pastes to be processed,
ventilation requirements may need to be reconsidered, bearing in mind
the allowable concentration of the contaminant in the workplace
environment and the lower explosive limit (LEL) of the solvent.
Depending on the equipment used, the materials handled, and the
operating conditions, many of these chemical processing operations can
result in worker exposures and increased risks of property damage if
uncontrolled. Increased risk may occur as a result of the actual
operation or as a result of loading and unloading the equipment.
Emphasis, therefore, should be placed on three main control areas:
preventing release of contaminant to the general atmosphere,
examination of fire and explosion risk and physical hazard potential.

Laboratory Operations

Laboratory operations as previously noted in this paper include
small—scale experimental research and testing activities conducted it
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either academic, or industrial research operations. Laboratory
operations are highly variable and, to a large degree, can be very
unpredictible. Many aspects of laboratory operations are of concern
and the types of hazards which can be generated and the ways of
generation are unlimited. For example, some operations will produce
contaminant release to the atmosphere as part of the "normal" operating
mode such as with the evaporation of volatile liquids from storage or
process vessels. With many laboratory operations, controlling
spillage, container failure, or potential explosion will substantially
reduce the risk of property loss or personal injury.
General practice in protecting laboratory personnel and property
from personal exposure and physical hazards has been the use of general
purpose protective equipment and personal protective devices. The most
common protective measure is the use of ventilated enclosures, such as
laboratory fume hoods, glove boxes, and biological safety cabinets.
This equipment can also be designed to protect personnel from
explosions, fire, and equipment breakage. To some degree, the use of
free standing open exhaust hoods has also come into practice in
laboratories as a means of providing a controlled environment.
Because laboratories often work with experimental material which

has not yet been fully characterized with respect to toxicity and/or
general hazards, control is of particular importance and should be
considered based on a combined review of toxicity levels of
contaminants generated and the physical properties of the material.
In general, problem areas experienced in laboratory operations can
be adequately controlled with ventilation. There are, however, some
areas which would require special attention to ensure proper control of
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contaminant release or contact with hazardous substances. Laboratory
operations using radioisotopes, carcinogens, and biological agents
present special problems from that of general hazard control for less
hazardous materials. Criteria for the control of these special hazards
have been published as Federal Regulations in the "Standards for
Protection Against Radiation", Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10,
Chapter 20 U.S. Federal Register; "Industrial Exhaust Systems", chapter
22, 1973 Systems Handbook, American Society of Heating, Refrigeration,

and air conditioning engineers, and National Sanitation Foundation,
Standard 49, Class II (Laminar Flow) Biohazard Cabinetry, May 1983.
In particular, control of biological agents can present a problem
which is different from other hazard control problems in the laboratory

in that two-way control is generally required. In addition to
protecting laboratory personnel from biological agents, it is also
necessary to isolate the biological materials from contaminants found
in the laboratory environment.
Because of the rapidly changing nature of work in the laboratory

environment, all operations in a laboratory should be examined for
their hazard potential and guidelines established to address them.

Manufacturing Equipment and Operations

Pharmaceutical products are usually marketed in three major forms
- tablets, capsules, and liquids. This involves the use of specific
equipment designed to produce the finished product in the desired form.

Typical equipment and operations utilized to produce final product
forms are compressing machines, pressure sealing, mixing, filtration,
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emulsification and/or esterification. Hazards connected with the use
of the above equipment usually involve vapor and dust exposures or
generation of a flammable vapor environment. Drug production
operations are, therefore, designed to handle any number of the above
operations by providing a floor plan layout which consists of a number
of rooms, one each to handle the major operations conducted: weighing,
blending, drying and grinding, tablet compressing, and packaging.
Batches of materials more often than not are manually handled at almost
every step of the operation and manually transferred to the next area
of the line. The manual handling of active pharmaceuticals is a major
concern in pharmaceutical manufacturing. In response to this concern,
continuous efforts are directed at identifying contaminant levels and
exposures resulting from the use of pharmaceutical production
equipment. In addition, physical hazards presented by equipment
operations such as compressing mixing, rotating, and slicing would also
require close scrutiny in order to engineer out any recognized hazards.
A brief description of the currently utilized equipment and
operations utilized in the industry to generate the three major forms
of products is provided below:

Tablet Manufacturing

The machinery used to produce tablets from granulations are
compressing machines. These machines produce three types of tablets compressed, cores for coating, and effervescent. The machines are
capable of producing thousands of tablets per minute, but are dependent
on a steady supply of free-flowing, uniformly granulated material.
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Tablets are measured by volume instead of weight. Three methods are
employed to ensure tablet uniformity.
A wet method, where the active ingredients are milled and mixed,
fillers and coloring materials added and the mass mixed again with a
binding agent added. The resulting wet mass is screened, dried, and
blended with other ingredients, and charged into a mixing machine. A
dry method for granules is employed where the nature of ingredients
will not allow exposure to heat or moisture without decomposition. The
powder is then compressed by heavy duty machines into large "slugs"

which are than broken up into the desired granulations, blended with
other ingredients and charged into a compressing machine. A direct
method is used when materials possess the physical properties desired
without additional treatment.
Coated tablets are produced from compressed tablet cores with
rounded edges. Prior to coating, the tablets are screened to remove
dust and broken cores. Equipment used in actually coating the tablets
consists of metal rotating pans and canvas lined polishing pans.
Effervescent tablets are commonly made by the addition of an
alkali bicirbonate with citric or tartaric acid to the formulation.
The method followed is to warm the preparation in a rotating pan,
rapidly dry under a vacuum and compress in a room with low humidity.
Special care must be taken to eliminate moisture from the process to
avoid material decomposition.

Capsule Manufacturing

Capsules are produced in two types, a hard type made of gelatin
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and water used to contain powder type medications, and a soft type, of
gelatin containing glycerol, usually used for containing oily
medications. Hard capsules are made leak proof by a very close fit and
the processes for making them are usually fully automatic. The capsule
body is formed, filled with powder from a hopper, sealed and blown dust
free. Soft capsules are filled similarly and made leak-proof by
pressure sealing.

Liquid Processing

Liquid pharmaceuticals are processed by mixing, filtration,

emulsification and/or homogenization. Three types of formulations are
produced - aqueous, hydroalcoholic or oily.

Mixing liquid formulations is accomplished in chemically resistant
tanks of various types. Some are jacketed to allow heating, cooling,
or sterilization. Others are designed to withstand pressure and/or
moderate vacuum. Storage tanks, sometimes fitted with agitators are
also used to store batches of product until needed.
Filter equipment is used to ensure and give clear, particle free
appearance to a formulation if required.

Filter equipment used

generally is of the plate and frame type.

Homogenizing and

emulsification are conducted on some formulations to give them a more
uniform consistency.
Ointments and fatty preparations of semi-solid consistency are
manufactured in the same manner as liquids except that they may be
passed through a piece of equipment called an ointment mill.
For liquid injectable products, manufacturing conditions must be
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sterile. These areas are usually small, enclosed, and constructed and
furnished in such a manner as to facilitate cleaning. Control of air

purity, temperature, and humidity is necessary as a support to other
meisures taken as part of the sterile design. Rooms are generally
maintained under a slight positive air pressure to prevent
contamination of the environment from unconditioned air in other areas.
Periodic checks are made of the bacteria and fungal counts to ensure
stability.

Extraction

Extraction plays an important role in the pharmaceutical industry
and must be included as an important part of the manufacturing
operation. In extraction, pharmaceutical substances are usually ground
to a smaller particle size to increase the surface area an then charged
into a closed vessel. Solvents are introduced which are capable of
dissolving desired active ingredients contained in the material. The
solution is then recovered from waste material by filtration,
centrifugation, heat vacuum evaporation, or a combination of the
methods.

Packaging

Packaging materials are used in the pharmaceutical industry to
protect products against damage, contamination, pilferage, and

decomposition. Depending on the preparation, these operations may
involve bag filling with powders, bottle filling with pills or liquids,
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blister sealing, filling of aerosols, and others. Most of the
equipment and procedures used to accomplish these operations are
standard in the industry, but special equipment does exist for the
filling of ampuls and vials.
Ampuls and vials designed to contain liquids are filled with
either single fill or multiple—fill equipment. The hypodermic syringe

is the basis for single fill equipment. Multiple—fill equipment
utilizes multiple stations of various designs, but all have the
objectives of placing a precise quantity of medication into a receiving
container. Jets of steam or a warming flame may be used to remove
droplets or moisture remaining on the lip. The ampuls are then passed
through high temperature sealing flames, followed by annealing flames
to relieve stresses in the glass.
Filling of dry powders into ampuls or vials is often accomplished
in a small hood with sleeved outlets into which the operator inserts
his gloved hands. This apparatus is usually called a "glove box" and
use of it allows the operation to be accomplished either manually or
automatically by meins of a feeder in a totally enclosed environment.

Process Exposures and Controls

The processes and operations employed in tablet, capsule, and
liquid product manufacturing are designed to produce the maximum
product in the minimum amount of time. The actions of the machinery,
no matter what the basis for operation, can create both physical
hazards and worker exposure to hazardous material.
For example, the high velocity action of a tablet compressing
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machine can create dust, noise, and pinch point type hazards.

Fortunately, many hazards are controlled through the use of
safety-interlocks, ventilation, and enclosures. Many of the controls
are designed into the equipment as a result of regulations passed by
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration.
One feature of the type equipment described is that much of it is
used for batch type operations. It is not unusual to find in this type
of operation the need to physically fill the bin or hopper above the
machine. The transfer of fine powder materials from one container to
another may release product to the general environment and cause a
potential exposure problem. With active pharmaceutical materials,
there would be a need to keep these exposures to a minimum if not
totally eliminated altogether. The use of local ventilation installed
near the emission source generally is used to control this type of
situation.

Where rotating pans are used for tablet coating purposes, the
equipment primarily consists of a metal pan resembling a small cement
mixer tilted at an angle, or a canvas lined polishing pan similarly
mounted. Dust release from the rotating action of the pan which causes
the tablets to impact against one another is the primary hazard of
concern. Noise levels and rotating equipment hazards also are of
concern with this type of equipment. Substances added to the pan to
assist the coating of the tablets may also be of concern depending on
their respective chemical and physical properties.
Again, localized or general ventilation is a major technique used
to minimize dust and vapor exposures. Guards generally are used to
eliminate potential physical injuries from the rotating parts of the
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equipment.
In capsule filling machines, because the capsule bodies are filled
from a hopper and are often blown "dust free" after filling, dust
exposures again are suggested as a potential problem area. Noise,
product contact, and physical hazards are also associated with the
operation of this equipment. Again localized ventilation or enclosure
of the operation helps to reduce exposures.

The use of mixers and blenders in the preparation of solid and
semi-solid formulations requires the same consideration as other
equipment when it comes to hazard control.

Many of the equipment operations and associated problems described
are similar to that commonly used and experience in other industries,

therefore, hazard controls used to reduce or eliminate those hazards
can also be considered in pharmaceutical manufacturing. The adequacy
of controls, however, which should be designed to protect the worker

from an assortment of physical and toxic agents produced by operation
of the above equipment, should be resolved prior to any operation

and/or process start-up. It would be a lot easier if all the product
line machinery in this industry were designed in a similar manner,
totally enclosed and virtually free of any hazards. Unfortunately for
the pharmaceutical industry, this is not the case, nor is it a feasible
or practical concept because of the usually high volume continuous

demand of its products. The need is to be flexible. Equipment must be
usable in various combinations to allow "changeovers" from one product
line to another as well as rapid development of methods to produce new
products with existing equipment.

CHAPTER V

SUGGESTED PROCESS HAZARD EVALUATION GUIDELINES FOR DRUG DEVELOPMENT

General

The previous chapters developed a background in Process Hazard
Review techniques, what process reviews are about, regulated drug

safety, and equipment processes and operations necessary to produce new
drug products.
The purpose of providing the background was to show that process
safety can cover a wide spectrum of concerns in any operation let alone
a drug manufacturing operation.

In actuality, process safety goes

beyond just looking at process failures.

It involves attitudes and

motivations of designers and production people, employee/management
support, human factors in supervision, effects of the legal system,
exchanges of information, available responses, public sentiment and
many other non-technical but vital influences on the attainment of an

acceptable level of risk control
Safety should be given full consideration whenever a new product

is to be developed and the full consideration philosophy should be part
of any process review program.
This leads to the primary reason for adopting the systems review
approach to safety, and is very nicely expressed in a recent system
safety publication.

"It replaces the crisis management of accident prevention of the
past by preplanned preventative control:
avoid the crisis by

95

96

foreseeing them".

32

Examination of a process or equipment for hazardous exposures to
personnel and to property are necessary and should be held from both a
theoreticil and a practical view. Theoretical studies of chemical
process have been made and often can predict occurrences more severe
than actual experience. The purpose of conducting the theoretical
studies is to give a feel for the seriousness of a situation and
highlight the effect of a particular variable on the probability or
outcome of an accident. Unfortunately, theoretical calculations and
highly structured analysis many times apply to very specific cases and
require a great deal of time and effort by specialists in various areas
if the results are to be reasonable and meaningful. Process reviews
are often not conducted or discourgaged because of this problem.
Hazard identification does require very careful thought to analyze
things as they are and to conceive of how they might be. The results
of the logical thought process are then compared with the desired end
result to determine the nature and extent of the hazards. Procedures
and guidelines are, therefore, helpful in reaching the desired result.
Clear thinking by informed and questioning minds is absolutely
essential.
The objective of process hazard guidelines then is to provide
those necessary elements which will provide a road map to the desired
result. These guidelines and procedures, however, should be practical

enough so that they can be applied in an effective reasonable manner.
Although the need for quantitative methods is recognized, the primary

32

"Hazard Prevention", Journal of the System Safety Society, Vol. 22,
No. 1 page 10.
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emphasis of the guidelines presented are qualitative. This is based on

the opinion that the pharmaceutical industry is already well controlled
by the Food and Drug Administration regulations with respect to product
toxicity and that implementation of a process review program will help

to close the gap in areas that are not so closely regulated such as the
processing of the raw materials and intermediates used in synthesizing
the final drug product.
Where the intent of typical process reviews is to look at process
failure, the guidelines presented in this thesis are intended to
provide a broad scope look at any problem that may be encountered when

a new drug is developed, and to also provide guidance in the specific
hazard problems encountered in the areas of research, development, and
manufacturing. The guidelines presented do not provide a complete
management plan or program for process safety in the pharmaceutical
industry because no single procedure can be considered "best" for all
cases. The suggested guidelines presented also favor the "what if",
"checklist" and "Hazop" methods because these procedures are ones that
are used most frequently by the chemical industry, are easier to
handle, can be accomplished in a reasonable amount of time, and are
more cost effective. 33

Process Safety Guidelines for Research

Hazards evaluation is important throughout the exploratory phase,

33 Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures, Battelle Columbus
Division for the Center for Chemical Process Safety, American Institute

of Chemical Engineers, N.Y., N.Y., page xviii.
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however, exploration work is the most difficult area in which to apply
process safety review principles because:

1.

There is little or no hazards information regarding the
experimental design at this stage.

2. There is minimal or no experimental experience.
3. The experimental design is likely to undergo significant major

modification.
Safety guards for addressing problems encountered in initial
experimental work can be addressed through utilization of a combined
approach which is suggested below:
1. First — all available information related to the research
project and all hazards information observed during discovery must be
documented and accompany the process. Because risks are often
uncharacterized during exploratory work, particular attention should be
directed at very specific cases. If the results are to be reasonable
then particular attention must be paid to:
o known hazardous reactions.
o observed exotherms.
o evidence of rashes, irritations, reactions, odors, etc.
o reactions using chemicals or biological agents that are
highly toxic.
o drug activity.
o Radioactive compounds and radiation sources (ionizing/nonionizing).

o carcinogens, mutagens, teratogens.
o laboratory operations where standard glassware or plastic
will be under pressure.
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o handling of compounds with respect to their unknown, yet
significant potential pharmacological properties.
2. Second - Controls should be incorporated for identified
hazards. When the risks are uncharacterized, hazards may be
minimized and protective safeguards established through:
o Generic Controls - use of personal protective equipment.
o Avoidance procedures - such as avoiding conditions of:
- evaporation to dryness.
- incompatibilities.
- excessive stoichimetry.
- reagent preparations.
To ensure that a proper evaluation is conducted in the exploratory
stage of work, all information must be carefully obtained and evaluated
for potential hazards, in accordance with the ongoing evaluation of
research. The summarized information from the experimental work should
now accompany the project to the next logical step, major revision or
scale-up.
When the exploratory stage of work has been completed, the R&D
chemist should summarize the important details of a particular process
for all products scheduled for future pilot plant operation. The
researcher's assessment of the exploratory experience should include:
1. A step-by-step summary detailing the individual operations
required for a particular transformation and any pertinent
chemical structures.
2. A tabulation of the potential hazards associated with
variations from the correct process conditions, e.g charging a

reaction to fast, loss of agitation, too much heat, etc.
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3. A summary of any liquid or solid waste (filter cakes, washes,
mother liquors or distillates) which would be produced in the
process.

The composition of each particular waste stream

should be given as well as any indication of an associated
disposal problem.
4. Recommended safe shutdown procedures in the event of a
reaction problem or a building emergency which would require
evacuation. This generally is intended to cover only special
shutdown procedures that are not covered by a standard format
or policy.
5. A summary of the potentially serious process deviations which
could result in problems during the various process steps.
This helps to put the whole process in perspective. Any
general impressions about the process not already recorded
should also be documented at this time.

Process Safety Guidelines for Development (Scale-Up)

Scale-up is a term used when going from small glassware (100m1 or
smaller) to larger glassware (1-5 liters) or to even larger glassware
(12-22 liters). It is most frequently used when going from glassware
(1-5 liters) to equipment in formulation laboratories or pilot plants
(5-10 gallons or more).
Process development is a complicated process which begins with
transfer from the discovery laboratory. Development may take several
years or just a few months, during which time the process may again
undergo frequent and significant change. At the development stage,
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however, there may still be considerably less safety related data
available and a variety of uncharacterized potential hazards. Faced
with this situation, process development, likewise, has the
responsibility to safeguard personnel and facilities and also to
provide a safe, final process for production.
Accomplishing these objectives requires continual examination of

the developmental process to identify potential new hazards that may be
introduced by change and scale-up.
1. Change complicates the hazard evaluation procedure by
introducing new components, whose hazards may be unknown, into
the process. These changes not only introduce new unknowns,
but may also negate previous safety information.
2. Scale-up, particularly initial scale-up, presents significant
potential hazards and requires very close evaluation.
Initial scale-up often presents the largest risk potential in
development processes. Uneventful experimental reactions on a
milligram scale can result in dramatic events on a 500 gram
scale (10,000 x increase). In particular, hazards to be
concerned about during scale-up include factors involving:
o concentration
o heat dissipation
o side reictions
o time differentials
o equipment changes
In scale-up, hazard evaluation test data should be an integral
part of any new drug development program review. While it may
not be appropriate to write a schedule of tests or to require
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excessive testing, there are certain tests which can be
conducted preceding and during process operation to provide
valuable decision data. Some of the tests include the
following:
o Physical tests such as differential scanning calormetry
(DSC), thermal gravimetric analysis (TGA), etc. should be
completed on isolated intermediates and products.
o Industrial Hygiene Monitoring

Studies

to

evaluate

containment equipment and practices.
o Biological and radiation testing for "abnormal" reaction
conditions or contaminant release.
Testing should be designed to provide basic information on the
hazard potential of the products and intermediates. Flash
point explosivity, permissible exposure limits, and lethal
dosage data represent some of the more important data that
should be obtained. Many of the tests can be performed by
developmentil laboratory personnel while more sophisticated
testing can be obtained through commercial testing facilities.
As the process proceeds through development, more experience and
data are obtained and procedures designed to address specific hazards
should be established.

Controls should also be more specifically

defined at this point.
The above factors combined with the considerable experience with
the process will form the basis for the technology transfer into the
manufacturing facility. Like the R&D chemist, the Process Development
chemist should summarize the work completed in the Pilot Plant and

provide experience and observation data to the summary file initiated
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during the experimental stage.

Process Safety Guidelines for Manufacturing

As interest in the new drug compound grows and the process moves
toward the production plant, a more formalized hazard assessment must
be accomplished to ensure that the process is safe once it moves into
full scale production.
The scale-up from the developmental stage to manufacturing
operations is of great importance. Enlarging the scale of reactions or
processes to the manufacturing level brings with it its share of
hazards and safety requirements. A review of procedures, investigation
and communication of knowledge involved in transmittal of a process to
manufacturing is, therefore, in order.
The primary responsibility for determining or obtaining all
necessary process information including full information on safety
aspects about the designated manufacturing process, lies with the
project group leaders and their technical associates. This
responsibility should be accepted as a continuation of review work
started and transferred from the laboratory and pilot plant side.
Much of the responsibility can be met by the preparation and

distribution of a checklist carefully designed for this purpose. A
guide of this type is desirable in all stages of the drug development
process, but becomes most urgent from the safety aspect when a large
scale-up such as from the pilot plant to manufacturing is planned.
This is because certain items that will appear on a large scale
checklist may not be critical in small scale operations but are
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critical on scale—up.
Preferably, technical and engineering persons in manufacturing
should become involved with the new process while it is in the process
development stage. In this way, there can be early recognition,
anticipation and correction of potential hazard areas. Ideally, when
transfer of a product from development to a production unit or directly
from a laboratory to a production unit is contemplated, review of

process data, using a checklist guide, should be started with the plant
personnel as early as possible prior to the transfer. At this point,
it is up to the manufacturing department to make sure that all of the
data necessary for safe production has been obtained and reviewed.

Considerations in Manufacturing Reviews

Several important considerations are involved in the scale—up to a
manufacturing operation. For example:

o

There must be a review with the Safety and Risk Management
Departments and others concerned with safety in the
manufacturing department.

o

The review should include a complete beginning—to—end
narrative of the process, with flow sheet covering process
equipment.

o

A material balance on the equipment flow diagram should be set
up.

o

There should be a clear definition of potential pollution and
health problems as well as physical, chemical, and biological
hazards.
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o

The process should be analyzed critically for possible
consequences of operator error and malfunction of equipment.

o

Process procedures and equipment should be thoroughly
inspected and attempts made to visualize effects of variations
such is temperature, pressure, pH, sequence of and rate of
addition of raw materials and under or overcharging of
materials that could result from operator error, mechanical
failure, or loss of services.

o

A job safety analysis or a study of the operation, element by
element, should be made to anticipate hazards and to remove
them or neutralize them by clearly defined means.

Preparation and Use of a Checklist

As the process reaches the production or manufacturing phase,

safety across the various stages of process scale-up has been dependent
on many interrelated factors, including types of equipment, process

variables, properties of materials used in the process, manning, and
many others. Attention at this point should continue to be primarily
focused at safety and health in an even more organized manner. With
this emphasis in mind, the use of process/system checklists are
recommended to provide direction in the evaluation and communication of
the minimal acceptable level of hazard evaluation that is required for
a particular process regardless of scope.
The checklist will also serve as a form of approval by various

staff and management functions before actual manufacturing is allowed
to begin. A checklist can be as detailed as necessary to satisfy the
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specific situation, but should also be applied conscientiously in order
to identify problems that require attention and to ensure that
procedures are being followed. With this in mind the checklist which
is designed by a given manufacturing unit might well include the
following safety and health items.

Chemistry of Process

o

Safe parameters of such variables as temperature, pressure,
pH, rates of addition of reactants, under and overcharge of
materials.

o

Process kinetics and thermochemistry.

o

Known side reactions.

o

Possible side reactions.

o

Stability of raw materials, reaction system, intermediates,
and final product to heat, light, air, water, metals, oils,
pH, and storage time.

Process Flow Sheets

o

Description of process.

o

Material flow streams.

o

Heat, cooling and other services.

o

Equipment and instrumentation.

o

Necessity of dual or redundant instrumentation.

o

Necessity of interlocking devices.

o

Fail-safe requirements.
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o

Materials of construction.

o

Effect of improper control or side reactions on materials.

Chemical Hazards

o

Possible induction effects, exothermic reactions.

o

Estimated decomposition energies of reactants and products.

o

Flammability characteristics of materials (i.e. flash point,
explosive range, auto ignition temperature).

o

Hazards of drying or grinding.

Biological Hazards

o

Handling procedures for biological agents - bacteria, viruses,
fungi and parasites, infected or potentially infected human or

animal cells, recombinant DNA molecules, and infectious
nucleic acids.

o

Pathogenicity of biological agents.

o

Disposal prictices.

Equipment Practices

o

Effect of failure of services, vacuum failure, air or water
leakage, and metal exposure.

o

Fouling of heat transfer services and instrument sensing

units.
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Health Hazards

o

Acute and chronic toxicity data or reactant products and

by-products including oral, dermal, and inhalation data.
o

First aid treatment and antidotes for various exposures.

o

Notification of medical department of work on toxic materials.

o

Procedures for safe handling of materials.

o

Procedures for decontamination of toxic or obnoxious
materials.

o

Personal protective equipment needed.

Operating Procedures

o

Possible effects of any deviations from the recommended range
of operating variables.

o

Preparation of a step-operating chart.

o

Procedure

for

discarding

unsatisfactory

product

or

intermediates.
o

Procedures for proper waste disposal.

o

Emergency shutdown procedures or action to be taken in the
event of having to terminate a reaction.

Analysis and Process Controls

o

Analysis of reactants and products.

o

Controls;
processing.

physical,

chemical,

and

biological

during
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Final Products

o

Labeling requirements.

o

Container size and type.

o

Pertinent DOT regulations.

o

Shelf-life or storage stability.

o

Special warehousing requirements.

o

Sensitivity to contamination.

Summary

The application of these suggested guidelines can be effective in
the identification and subsequent management of process hazards no

matter what phase a process is in - research, development, or
manufacturing. The primary emphasis has been on qualitative procedures
for hazard identification, although some procedures for quantitative
hazard analysis may be needed to fully identify all hazards for more
complex operations.
Actions to reduce hazards and improve the safety of a particular

process operation, however, are no better than the extent to which
hazards are recognized in the first place. No single procedure is
best for all cases. A good process safety hazard identification
progrim requires the continuous feedback of information between
research, development, and manufacturing units and will be rewarded

with a continuing improvement of process safety throughout the project
and an accident free performance record at the eventual termination of
the project.

CHAPTER VI

OTHER FACTORS INFLUENCING DRUG DEVELOPMENT SAFETY REVIEWS

General

The degree of safety achieved in any safety program depends
primarily on management support and emphasis. The success of the

process hazard review effort also depends largely on management support
and their taking definitive action on recognized safety hazards. Their
support is also necessary in order to translate written recommendations
into practical principles and techniques to eliminate and/or control
the recognized process hizards.
It also must be realized, however, that the total success of a
process review program in drug development, or for that matter, any

manufacturing industry, also depends on factors other than management
emphasis and effective guidelines. There must be an overall awareness
about the potential for acute hazards which should also encompass such
areas as:
o Information — Manufacturers who in the past have been reluctant
to tell the public what hazards are contained within the plant
confines need to work together with public officials to reduce
heightened concern about their operations.
o Emergency Plans — Manufacturing plants in the past have been

ill equipped to handle or cope with toxic chemical incidents.
Emergency response plans should be formulated and included as

part of the Process Review Program to handle any potential for
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an incident which would involve the public.
o Plant Safety Programs

- Safety programs vary widely among drug

and chemical manufacturers due to management commitments and
cost factors.

This can be especially true in older plants

where improvement to meet safety standards could quickly
escalate costs to figures approaching the original cost of the
plant.
o Training - Good training in safety principles should be part of
every company's training program. New operators should receive
orientation training in both safety procedures and job
responsibilities.

Annual refresher training should also be

included as part of the overall company training program.
o

Auditing - In addition to recommended process reviews, plants

should be regularly audited to evaluate the effectiveness of
their safety programs and to analyze their overall risks.
o Computer Controls - Utilization of computerized process
controls to curb such events as runaway reactions helps to
eliminate the human error factor.

However, many times

decisions to implement computer controlled process are often
postponed due to the associated costs.
o

Company Culture

- Company philosophy and culture needs to be

examined. Consider what is valued, what attention is focused
on and how it is administered.

Are responsible individuals

promoted to key decision making positions? This play an
important role in the commitment to plant safety.
o Worker Practices

- Workers should be required to employ good

work practices in carrying out their job duties.

Such work

112

practices are the results of good training and education
programs in the potential hazards associated with each job, and
the requirement for personal safety protection.
A good Process Hazard Review Program in drug development,
therefore, needs to be proactive and not reactive if the pharmaceutical
industry is to avoid further government regulation and the increased
threat of liability lawsuits. In fact, experts say that regulation
cannot guarantee safety, only a will to be safe can.

30

Hazard Reduction and Application of Experience

The pharmaceutical industry as other industries has accumulated a
wealth of documented safety related experience based on accidents,
incidents, failures and testing which if used properly could be most
effective in improving the safety performance in current and future
drug development programs. The problem that is faced, however, is how
do you effectively apply this experience.
A paper by Earl M. McNeil of Martin Marietta Aerospace aptly
describes a concept for applying the experience factor. In doing so,
it supports the need for a relatively simple technique to identify
potential hazards in new product development and the benefits of using
checklists.
Mr. McNail believes that technology disclosures reach our
universities and corporations in a relatively short time, but that new
technology is usually a small part of each new product program. Major
34

Dramand, Stuart, "Problems at Chemical Plants Raise Broad Safety
Concerns", New York Times, Monday, November 25, 1985, page D11.
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deficiencies and resulting accidents or incidents are largely related
to design and operational conditions in areas where there are 10 or
more years experience. Because much of the documented experience which
experience which has been developed to aid in the reduction of hazards
has been implemented through educational techniques, such as handbooks,
manuals and hazard type catalogs aimed at the individual, a need now
exists to develop improved methods for effective application of the
documented experience.
Within the improved methods is the inherent role of management and
all technical disciplines involved in product development and its
intended use. This responsibility has been inherent in engineering,
quality, reliability, and other activities, but in reality much time is
not really spent reading hazard catalogs, statistical information or
accident investigation reports. In addition, despite recognized
efforts by corporations in acknowledging the need to coordinate all
technical disciplines, specifically from a safety standpoint, and the
documented experience in the form of special studies, accident—incident

summaries, technical interchange meetings, etc., many of the same
mistakes which have caused accidents, incidents or failures in the past

are still being made over and over in each new program. McNail feels
that even with increased emphasis, System Logic Analysis and many other
forms of analysis, certain type of hazards and subsequent failures have
continued to occur. 35
The McNail report identified three basic objectives that were

35 McNail, Earl M., "Hazard Reduction Through Allied Experience" Martin

Marietta Aerospace Skylab Operations, Huntsville, Alabama, System
Safety Society International Symposium, July 1973, Paper No. 11B-7,
page 2.
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factored into a study to develop a technique to increase effectiveness
in applying retained safety related experience to the design and
operation of plant equipment. 36

1. The first objective was to provide for systematic application
consistent with each phase of program development. Flow

charts were developed to provide an overview of the
evolutionary process by which a product is developed, from
conceptual design through final product utilization.
2. The second objective was to provide a method to assist all
disciplines in the application of safety related experience.

This took into consideration many problems which have been
facing safety managers and engineers throughout the industry.
Some of the factors considered were:

o Limited number of safety personnel.
o Limited multidiscipline experience of safety personnel.
o Cost constraints limiting the development of large
safety organizations.
o Limited visibility and understanding of the functions
and activities of safety personnel by the various
engineering, production or operations personnel at all
levels of the organization.
o Limited effectiveness of safety personnel to influence
product design and development. Factors affecting this
particular area include: late assignment to a program,

36

McNail, Earl M., "Hazard Reduction Through Allied Experience" Martin
Marietta Aerospace Skylab Operations, Huntsville, Alabama, System
Safety Society International Symposium, July 1973, Paper No. 11B-7,
page 2.
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late completion of hazard analysis for designs reaching
the production phase, and a limited number of safety
personnel in combination with safety engineering time
spent in developing plans, procedures and techniques
required to implement specified program level safety
requirements.
Recognizing that such factors either individually or in
combination can vary greatly, Mr. McNail felt there was no
universal solution apparent. It was at this point, however,
that he notes that "to be effective such a technique would
have to be relatively simple and compatible with established
policies, procedures and practices of many disciplines within

a wide variety of programs." 37
3. The third objective was to provide a method to determine the

effectiveness of the application of retained safety
experience. To achieve this objective, visibility of results
was required. Safety program performance based on
conventional indicators such as accident frequency, severity
or lost—time was not considered to be sufficient enough to
achieve the objective. The primary concern was on accident
prevention with emphasis on recurrence control. Here he
determined that a method to test effectiveness would be
initially based on potential hazards identified and actions
taken to control or eliminate known accident or incident
causes. Statistical trends could then be developed for

37

Op. Cit. page 3.
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individual accident causes or groups of accident causes for

comparison with similar factors taken from accident history.
Future records could then be compared with previous records to
determine performance improvements in specific areas of
concern.
Mr. McNail provides this example:
Inadequacy of relief protection has historically been a
factor in equipment loss or damage. Although relief
devices have been installed to protect against overpressurization from such causes as regulator failure or
human error, they have in many cases failed to do so. They
have been found to be undersized with respect to the
maximum flow capacity of an upstream failed-open regulator;
found to be improperly set with respect to protection for

the end product being pressurized; and found to be
inhibited by caps, plugs or valves. Improper sizing of
relief devices as a single design feature could be
identified, corrected and actions recorded as part of the
systematic technique selected for applying retained
experiences. The effectiveness of the method (or system)
could then be determined by visibility of hazards
identified and corrected in current systems or products,
and ultimately by comparison of past and future accident
records.
To bring about the actions necessary to correct

deficiencies, the approach taken would also have to provide
management visibility to aid 03. making decisions associated
with cost, schedule and risk."'
Mr. McNail goes on to develop a concept for experience retention
techniques, one which he classifies into two categories.
1. The first category is the retention of the individual having
experience and relates to the application of education and
experience of individuals with the objective of tailoring and
maintaining the organization to meet the needs of a specific
program or task.
38

Op. Cit. Page

3.
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2.

The second category involves the retention of the
collective experience of all individuals. This category
involves the development of standards, manuals, processes and
a variety of management systems and methods to direct and
control technical and production operations. It is in this
category that McNail believes we should focus our attention
in order to improve our effectiveness in the systematic
application of the collective experience that so much time
and expense was taken to document.

Mr. McNail follows by challenging the need to utilize advanced
methodologies and variations of those methodologies for hazard
identification. It is his belief as well as the author's, that cost,
limited numbers and experience of analysts, complexity of techniques
and differences in established management practices within
organizations have resulted in limited acceptance of many of the more
sophisticated techniques. He further indicates that studies have shown
that the ultimate success of a hazard analysis, regardless of the
method used, is directly related to the knowledge and experience of the
analyst. An understanding of analytical procedure does not necessarily
ensure that an adequate hazard analysis will be performed. He

believes, therefore, that a logical tool that can be applied to all
methodologies to assist in the identification of hazards, is a
checklist; specifically, a checklist based on tests, field operating
experience and accident history. A checklist approach incorporating
certain unique features necessary for disciplined implementation was
considered by McNail to be the most practical in meeting the stated
objectives. Using criteria which have become generally accepted
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throughout industry, Mr. McNail offers the following logical sequence

for the reduction of hazards. 39
o Design for minimum hazards (implies inherent safety in product
development and design as an ultimate goal).
o

Incorporate fail—safe features to minimize the effects of

inherent hazards in the event of failure or the occurrence of
undesired events due to improper use or human error.
o Incorporate hazard detection and corrective action features
to warn of in impending or out of tolerance condition and to
provide means to limit or control the effects.
o Develop special operating instructions and precautionary notes
or warnings within procedures to identify hazards associated
with improper or out—of—sequence operations. This hazard
reduction technique is especially important to manufacturing
processes, assembly instructions, test procedures and repair or
maintenance procedures. Many hazards thought to be reduced by
design features have resulted in failures or accidents due to
improper assembly.
o Provide training and certification of assembly,

test,

inspection, and operating personnel to ensure their awareness
of identified residual hazards. This training should be
developed to familiarize personnel with design or procedural
controls which have been established in order to minimize risk.
The factors of cost and schedule also bear great influence on

decisions once a new product development program idea is released and

39 Op. Cit. page 4-6.
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the exploratory, development, manufacturing and testing have started.
This often results in the tendency to apply procedural controls or rely
more on individual knowledge or awareness rather than team knowledge to
control potential hazards in order to minimize change. It is
important, therefore, to recognize that hazard identification and
reduction improvements must be initiated at the outset of program
development and that these improvements towards risk reduction become a
team concept and priority.
Mr. McNail concludes that the basic concept of progressive "total
program" application of system safety checklists can be effectively

implemented on any program, subsystem or product of any size or
complexity. A master set of checklists can be developed from which
applicable sections or criteria statements can be selected to fit a
given discipline, product or program. This approach would minimize
continual redevelopment efforts on each program or for each product.
However, the need to select and tailor the criteria to the specific
product, operation, or program is essential to the achievement of the
stated objectives.

40

Professor Kenneth Andrews of the Harvard School of Business
Administration noted that every accident, no matter how minor, is a
failure of organization. A repetition of the accident or incident is
difficult to excuse if preventative information is available and not
used. 41

This statement has proved to be very true in light of the

information known about the challenger Space Craft prior to its
40
41

Op. Cit. page 14.

NASA Safety Program, Manned Space Program Accident—Incident
Summaries, March 1970.
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disastrous space flight in February 1986.
To further improve our performance in current and future product
development programs, the following additional points were also
suggested by Mr. McNail:
o

Management Acceptance that the development and issuance, in
itself, of documentation such as hazard evaluation procedures,
operating procedures, accident/incident summaries and similar
data, does not ensure that it will be effectively used.

o

A systematic method to determine the effective application of
hazard information must be implemented within each program or
for each product development activity.

o

The cost of an effective accident prevention program may be
far less than an accident, the subsequent investigation,
corrective action and damage to public relations.

Figure 8 shows an example of a concept that process review in a
pharmaceutical drug development program is "global" in practice and
depends on the collective input (experience) of all participating
groups. Process safety checklists and HAZOP type analysis
progressively applied throughout drug product development, along with
transfer of information, will also increase knowledge of conditions
that exist from previous experience which have caused accidents,
incidents or failures in the past. Management recognition of these
conditions in a timely fashion is essential to their making decisions
about cost and risk at an early stage so they will ultimately cost less
to eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level.
Mr. McNail's concept of progressive application of experience data
and use of checklists provides a good basis for developing a practical
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GLOBAL CONCEPT OF PROCESS REVIEW IN DRUG DEVELOPMENT

GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS (OSHA, EPA)
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and useful process hazard review in drug development. As noted
earlier, the use of laborious analytical techniques for hazard
identification are not presently attractive to an industry that is
already closely regulated because they manufacture products which are
consumed by living human beings. The simplified more practical
approach, as suggested by the latter techniques, would gain far greater
support for safety professionals attempting to implement a process
review program in the pharmaceutical industry.

Computer Assistance in Process Safety

Computers have become well established as tools to increase the
productivity of the general work force. Word processing, electronic
spreadsheets, and data base management software packages now provide
their users with welcome relief from tedious computations and
burdensome recordkeeping activities. The pressing need for increased
productivity and greater safety are moving process safety toward this
new formidable technology.
In the production of drug products process measurement and control
become important factors not only from a quality standpoint but from a
safety standpoint. By utilizing computer technology, safety is
guaranteed by monitoring both the potential courses of emergencies and
their consequences. Process Hazard Review programs can also be made
easier to handle by using a computer to ease the job of gathering and
maintaining process safety information. Typically, applications of the
computer to which the average individual is exposed is that of data
collector and processor. Another area of application which is now
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seeing increased usage is the computer as a device for the transfer of
expert knowledge.
For example, information may be needed on regulations governing
proper storage of chemicals, correct usage of a particular chemical or
correct disposal methods and procedures for chemicals. Even for simply
handling the chemicals, several sources of information may need to be
investigated.
Recordkeeping is another reason for utilizing a computerized
information system in process hazard review. A good information system
can effectively manipulate data, and reorganize it in any fashion for
the process review team to use to best advantage. For instance,
various type of recordkeeping files that could be maintained and easily
updated for process hazard review meetings are:
o Personal Protection - who has been assigned equipment, for what
purpose, what type, and when issued.
o Training records - types of training, frequency, and subjects.
o Environmental data - such as personal sampling data,
environmental sampling data, spills and releases.
o Medical Surveillance data - audiometry, blood contaminant
levels, spirometry results, etc.

o Risk assessment data - accident and injury statistics for both
accident prevention as well as development of training programs
and statistical evaluations.
o Emergency response procedures.
o Material Safety Data Sheet information - giving information on
acute and chronic exposure symptoms, how to handle chemical

hazards,

physical

properties,

incompatible

materials,
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antidotes, toxicology and more.
A further advantage of adopting a computerized information system
for a process hazard review program in drug development is the ability
to network independent computer systems at various site locations into
a central computer thus providing greater freedom and flexibility of
information transfer. Networking also provides the advantage of
pooling of information resources, standardization of data, and
prevention of duplication of effort. It is further evident that in
promoting process hazard reviews in the exploratory, development, and
manufacturing phases of drug development, the ability to transfer
safety data as the process progresses becomes of extreme importance in
preventing and controlling hazards at the earliest stage possible.
The use of a computer in process review may in fact be most
important during the exploratory stage of drug development. In most
research and development, much of the effort goes into literature
searches for the pertinent information. By having access to an
information and/or data management system an experimentalist can
manipulate data and retrieve it in a desired format. Records of
abstracts from engineering/technical literature; reliability and
failure data; microfilmed product catalogs, mechanical and physical
properties of materials, requirements by various standard setting
agencies such as ANSI, ASME, NFPA and others can be quickly and easily
obtained to provide the most information possible when design of a
process is in the conceptual stage.
Even while the review of a particular process is taking place, the
computer may play an important role in helping to resolve unique
potential problem areas. For example, a review could look at the
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changing interfaces between people, processes, the equipment they run
and the compounds produced. One area currently being explored is the
use of computer controlled robots. Computer controlled robots are
increasingly being used as substitutes for humans in dangerous
operations. In drug development, robots can be utilized to replace
workers performing tasks with potent drugs. In manufacturing
operations, robots can be used as a mechanical manipulator to provide
physical separation between the worker and the chemical or physical
source of the hazard.
As a data base information resource and a process control device,
computers will provide a process review team with the ability to get to
the roots of potential process hazards quickly, reduce the overall time
needed to conduct a process review and provide greater safety,
productivity and overall cost-savings for the process as well. In
today's highly technical world, the computer becomes a natural tool for
assessing and managing process risks.

Role of the Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS) in Drug Process Reviews

A. The Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDS) is a document which
describes the specific identity of a material. The MSDS will:
1. Define a material's chemical characteristics which may
result in hazards in the workplace;
2.

Recommend methods of protection against these hazards;

3.

Outline the health effects of the material; and

4.

Suggests procedures for worker protection during emergency

situations.
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B. Use of Material Safety Data Sheet information will also help
to:
o

assist management and process review teams in making
decisions relative to facility and process planning.

o

provide line managers with safety and health information
on drug substances and assist them in ensuring employee
protection.

o

assist in meeting regulatory compliance requirements.

o

help minimize losses from injury, illness, fire and
explosion.

o

provide sifety and health data prior to initiating
exploratory work and for process transfers to pilot plant
and production facilities.

In new drug development, Material Safety Data sheets more than
likely will be only available for the raw materials used to make the
new drug compound. Therefore, it is imperative that commencing as
early as the exploratory phase that safety data developed on the new
drug product be developed into an MSDS. This should occur at two
distinct phases in the drug development cycle:
1. A preliminary MSDS issued on completion of preclinical
toxicological studies (development phase).
2. A final MSDS - about the time of NDA submission when clinical
studies are completed (prior to production).
Information for a new pharmaceutical active should be collected
from in-house toxicology data, in-house experience data, and other
resources, compiled into a preliminary MSDS, and reviewed by a special
committee. If available information is not adequate for hazard
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determinations, then additional testing should be performed before a
new process is allowed to continue towards scale-up.
While gathering of information by the process review team may seem
to be an overwhelming task, the use of material safety data sheets, if
available, will certainly make it an easier and less formidable one.
The eight basic information sections provided on a MSDS sheet will give
valuable information related to:
1. Identification - the chemical name, trade name and any
synonyms by which the material may be called. The Chemical
Abstract Service (CAS) number and structural formula are also
given.
2. Hazardous Ingredients or Components - this section lists any
hazardous ingredients that make up at least one percent of the
total mixture. It also lists the Threshold Limit Values (TLV)
which is a measure of the health effects.

A PEL or

Permissible Exposure Limit is a similar level set by OSHA.
3. Physical Data - listing of this data helps to identify the
substance by observing its physical properties. It will
describe the material's physical appearance, odor, boiling
point and other technical data.
4. Fire and Explosion Hazard - this information lets you know
beforehand how to control a fire, it contains the flashpoint
and flammable limits of the material.
5. Reactivity Data - reactivity data alerts the user to
conditions the materials must avoid in order to prevent

dangerous reactions.
6. Health Hazard Data - this data provides the routes of entry as
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well as effects of overexposure.

Emergency and first aid

information provides methods of treating overexposure.
7. Precautions for Safe Handling and Use - outlines steps that
should, be taken to clean up the material if it is spilled.
Also provides methods for waste disposal and handling and
storage precautions.
8. Control Measures - includes recommendations for respiratory
protection, or any other special safety equipment needed for
working with the materials.
The overall purpose of a Material Safety Data Sheet, therefore, is
as a vehicle to inform employees of the potential hazard of a material
and to assist management in meeting requirements for protecting the
safety, health and well being of employees. If properly used by the
process review team, the MSDS can be one of the most valuable tools in
the identification of process hazards.

CHAPTER VII

Conclusion

The scope, organization, process review format and method,
regulatory effects, types of drug manufacturing processes, and
background as related to a new drug development process in the
pharmaceutical industry have been discussed throughout this paper with
the purpose of recognizing that there are a variety of "safety review
systems' available to systematically review a process or project for

identifiable hazards. Most as noted earlier are too laborious to be
practical and/or applicable in pharmaceutical research or scale-up
work. In concluding this thesis, the concept of a multiple level
review method which incorporates those guidelines discussed for
research, development and manufacturing are developed into examination
worksheets which can be easily used and transferred between major
operations or locations.
The multiple level review method is a three level information
gathering approach that is designed to enable a comprehensive yet
practical assessment of a new drug process or product from the
regulatory, safety and occupational health viewpoints.
The multi-level approach can be used as a tool to evaluate the
safety of new processes as they develop to assure compliance with
applicable governmental regulations, company/corporate standards, and
most importantly to provide the necessary vehicle for early recognition
of hazards and risks. It can also assist the business area management
in conserving development resources by evaluating processes early
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enough in the development stages so that those approaches which have
less health, safety, or environmental concerns, can be selected over
others with a high degree of recognized hazard.
Examples of the type of forms or checklists that should be used to
collect and organize information in each major phase of a drug
product's life (research, pilot plant, manufacturing) are discussed
below and provided in Appendices A-C. These forms are necessarily
general, and include both a checklist and discussion type format for
items to be reviewed. The checklists should be specifically tailored
to suit the priorities of the individual company, plant, product, or
operation to achieve the most success.

Level I Process Examination Worksheet - Exploratory Phase

Since laboratory and bench-scale experiments often involve the
short term use of small quantities of material, the materials can often
be of unknown or little known toxicity. Because of the large numbers
and variety of materials used in R&D work, it is not always possible or
practical to obtain complete safety data on each material before
proceeding with experimental work. Therefore, even though the
scientific background of the experimenter may be very advanced, work is
usually conducted under the assumption that any material of unknown
toxicity is in fact highly toxic and should be handled accordingly.
Preparation of a Level I examination form encourages early
documentation of any concerns for employee health and safety in the
research stage of drug development. If the researcher addresses these
questions and records the information, the researcher and other
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employees exposed to the material(s) should be able to proceed with a
high degree of confidence and safety. If a material or class of
materials has a recognized problem, the information can be documented
and the problem eliminated or controlled before an exposure or major
incident can develop. A manufacturer's MSDS should be requested
whenever a new sample of a chemical material is ordered. If not
available from the supplier, other sources should be investigated. The
Level I package should include information on the chemical's identity,
physical properties, hazardous properties (fire, reactivity), health
effects, sources of supply and locations where it will be used or made
in the facility. For new compounds, this package is the basis for
identification of data gaps such as physical property characterization,
analytical method development and toxicological testing development.

Level II Process Examination Worksheet — Pilot Plant Development

New drug materials once through the exploratory stage will move on
for further development in the Pilot Plant. At this level, materials
are used in larger quantities and for greater periods of time. The
potential for a negative process event involving the material or
equipment becomes greater and control becomes more difficult because
more people are working with the material. Much more information is
needed at this point and the major concerns of the process are
addressed by the Level II examination form. This package is more of an
overview and focuses on the new product or process and not on the
individual raw materials. A committee to handle the Level II
eximination should be formed at this time and a thorough review of the
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Level I package completed before proceeding with the Level II
examination.
As a minimum effort, a material safety data sheet should be
prepared if one is not available in the exploratory Level I stage.
Handling procedures should also be reevaluated at this point to assure
that they are appropriate for the scale of work being performed and the
hazard involved.
At this point also, appropriate toxicity tests for new materials
and miterials where toxicity is not well understood, should have been
completed during R&D work and passed on before the process is

transferred to the pilot plant. Additional literature searches and
possibly acute toxicity testing, might be appropriate at this stage.
Since the new material will be processed in larger quantities, the
need to begin to look at the concern for prevention of environmental
pollution due to a release or other factors becomes important.
Information obtained in Level I and Level II examinations is extremely
valuable in preparing premanufacture notifications and forms the basis
for the overall objective of examining not only safety and health, but
also environmental and property loss. The Level II package sould
include any new, or changes of, materials involved, changes in the
process or people involved, location of trials, safety precautions,
quantities of materials and types and quantities of wastes, along with
information such as whether samples will be shipped to potential
customers. This package is completed prior to any trials and is
reviewed and approved by all company environmental, industrial hygiene
and safety groups, and the process review committee.
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Level III Process Examination Worksheet — Plant Production/
Manufacturing

At full scale production, new concerns are raised. Information
documented at Level I and Level II is essential in order for plant
supervision to recognize and evaluate similar and possible newly

introduced hazards resulting from the increased scale—up.
Full scale production represents a greater commitment, use of an
even larger amount of material and poses even greater problem with
regard to process hazards than the laboratory or pilot plant studies
did. There are increased numbers of workers handling material,
equipment is larger, and potential pollution and exposures may be
greatly increased.
Governmental regulations become significant at this point and the
handling of a material from receipt as a raw material to customer use
of the finished product must also be reevaluated. The Level III
examination form addresses these key areas of concern and provides a
good information base as the plant prepares to process the new drug
material. The Level III examination package should include:
o

A review of Level I and II packages.

o

A complete process description with estimates for production
volumes .

o

Descriptions and specifications for protective equipment,
safety precautions, monitoring procedures.

o

Information regarding any potential for spills.

o

A discussion of any potential for and route of possible
employee exposure.
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o

A review of all toxicological information from both literature
and testing programs run during product development.

o

A description of any testing in currently in progress.

o

A description of environmental release information and waste
disposal procedures, if any.

o

Methods for transportation of raw materials, intermediates and
final products of the customers processing.

Prior to production, this examination form should be reviewed by
the company Industrial Hygienist, Safety, Product Safety, Pollution
Control and Medical Director as well as the site Environmental,
Industrial Hygiene and Safety personnel. Production is authorized only
after the Level III package has been approved.

Implementation of the Multi—Level Review Program

Effective implementation of the Multi—Level Process Examination
Program requires those personnel in charge to assume and carry out
their responsibilities through all phases of the review program. In
the Level I area covering research and development, the research
scientist in charge of product or product development should bear the
responsibility of preparing the process examination form for each new
process handled in the laboratory and for the "final product" being
developed.
The research scientist should also involve site safety and

industrial hygiene personnel at this point if a literature search was
completed and little or no information was found. Attempts should also
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be made to obtain toxicological data from the supplier, in order to
obtain as much safety data as possible as early in the project
development as possible.

Experimentation should not be initiated until the review form has
been fully examined by Safety and Industrial Hygiene and Environmental

personnel. Information related to identified hazards and recommended
procedures for eliminating or controlling them should be documented on
the form and communicated to the research scientist in charge.
At Level II or the Pilot Plant Scale—Up/Trial phase, all Level I
information should be provided by the research scientist to pilot plant
personnel in charge of the process. In many cases, a cooperative
effort is needed with both pilot plant and research personnel in charge
to effectively transfer the safety data learned in the exploratory
phase to the development phase. A "meeting of the minds" also benefits
the need to provide an accurate and safe production scheme and process
material balance. Level II and III examination should be conducted by
a committee similar to that described on page 14 of Chapter I. A
separate review committee should be commissioned for each examination.
A separate Level II data sheet should now be completed for each
plant trial or run to be conducted. Level I and Level II data sheets
with attachments should then be submitted to the Safety and Industrial
Hygiene and Environmental Departments for review, comments and
recommendations before any plant trial runs are scheduled. Again, the
form with any recommendations from the latter will be returned with
appropriate recommendations and any additional requirements.
At this stage, it can now be seen that it becomes easier and less
time consuming to accumulate information as the drug development
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program progresses, rather than trying to obtain it all at once.
Since plant trials can be conducted at different locations,
approvals to conduct a trial at this level should be confined to the
specific location. The reason for this is that each location generally
will have a different set of safety and health considerations,
therefore, a review conducted at one location will not necessarily be
appropriate for another. A separate Level II review is, therefore,
required under these circumstances.
When the new drug process reaches the commercialization stage, a
Level III review should be completed by the Production Supervisor and
any other department personnel responsible for the manufacturing and
production of the material. A complete information package from Level
I and Level II reviews should be submitted prior to the Level III
review. Again, since information has been accumulated as the process
progressed, this review should be less time consuming with a lot of
valuable information available to production personnel.
The entire package containing Level I, II and III information
should be reviewed by Safety and Environmental personnel for approval
as in the past reviews. "Transfer of knowledge" meetings between pilot

plant and production are highly recommended at this point, especially
since the magnitude of scale—up is many times greater than that

experienced between the exploratory and development phases.
Final hazards assessment should be prepared by the department in
conjunction with safety, environmental, legal, and risk management

personnel. Upon approval from these groups, the entire process review
package (Levels I, II and III) are returned to the production location.
The suggested use of a more simplified process hazard review
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format in new drug development does not preclude the need for
quantitative or more complex methods. Many companies have detailed
process review programs or policies in place. It is the author's
personal experience after working in both the chemical and
pharmaceutical industries that there is a reluctance to get involved
with the more complex, time consuming and costly effort involved with
these approaches. Rather than not have a review of a potentially
hazardous process at all because no one wants to get involved, this
writer sees the philosophy to be one of practicality while at the same
time casting an eye towards the more quantitative review methods on an
"as need basis".
The approach to process hazard review in drug development or any

product development program is dependent on an organizational
commitment to safety and consideration of safety early in the
design/development of the process. There must also be a commitment to

the broad consideration of safety issues to assure that safe operating,
programming and maintenance procedures are in effect. Project
Management must be aggressive in dealing with safety by:
o

assigning responsibility for safety

o

establishing an accountability mechanism for results

o

consideration of safety at each milestone

o

ensuring that relevant safety information is forwarded to the
next operational level in a timely fashion.

As a concluding point in support of a process review program in
drug development to prevent major incidents, a reference to a Bible
passage in an article by G. Kinsley in a 1983 edition of Professional

Safety magazine perhaps provides an apt ending. The article titled
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"Potential Accident Analysis" quotes the following words of advise.

42

"If you dig a pit, you fall in it; if you break through a wall, a
snake bites you. If you work in a stone quarry, you get hurt by
stones. If you split wood, you get hurt doing it. If your ax is
dull and you don't sharpen it, you have to work harder to use it.
It is smarter to plan ahead."
Ecclesiastes 10:8-10
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Kinsley, George R., "Potential Accident Analysis", Professional
Safety, July 1983, page 25.

Warner-Lambert Company
201 Tabor Road
Morris Plains, New Jersey 07950

201 540-2000
Cable Address: WAPNLAM MORRISPLAINS
Telex: 136424 (WARNERLAM MOPS)

January 21, 1987
Mr. Rudy Schwarz

Dear Rudy,
My thanks to you for asking me to review your Masters Thesis: "A Process
Review Program for Drug Development. I very much enjoyed reading it and think
it will serve as a valuable resource to the safety community.
I offer the following comments for your consideration. I believe they will
enhance the thesis by making more complete;
1.

Add examples of FMEA, FTA and HAZOP. They will aid in
understanding of these hazard analysis techniques.

2.

Add a flow diagram of the drug development cycle to Chapter 3.

3.

In Chapter 4 you describe a number of chemical and pharmaceutical
process steps and types of equipment. Add examples of equipment to
the various sections to provide a reference.

4.

On page 82 you begin a discussion of pharmaceutical manufacturing,
followed by descriptions of tablet and capsule manufacturing. As
several of the processing steps described in tablet manufacturing ie.
weighing, blending, granulation, milling, also apply capsule
manufacturing, consider rearranging this section to make this clear or
preface the sections on tablet and capsule manufacturing with the
description of these process steps.

5.

Include examples of physical tests, such as, differential scanning
calorimetry (DSC), thermal gravimetric analysis (TGA), etc., as part
of your discussion on "Development Work" on page 98. These tests
should also be included in Appendix B, Level II Process Review Form.
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Again, my thanks for asking me to review your thesis. I hope the comments
are of value.
Pd like to take this opportunity to congratulate you on completing the
Masters of Science Program in Health and Safety Management at MIT. Your
hard work and determination have paid off.
Best regards,

MJ.anGgerl,tSfy
U.SOperations
JMG/no
#222

SCHERING CORPORATION
60 ORANGE STREET

BLOOMFIELD, N. J. 07003

CABLES: SCHERING BLOOMFIELD, N.J.
TELEX: 138183
TELEPHONE: (201) 429-4000

January 26, 1987

Mr. Rudolph R. Schwarz

Dear Mr. Schwarz:
I have reviewed your thesis paper entitled "A Process Hazard Review
Program for New and Existing Drug Development Programs". The paper is
well organized and provides an excellent framework for the establishment
of a formal process hazard review program. The sections on system
safety and phamaceutical processing are valuable in acquainting the new
safety professionals with the concepts used in this industry. The
inclusion of specific forms in the appendices will promote the effective
use of the process hazard review process.
Sincerely,

/t b

David J. Struebel, CIH, CSP
Industrial Hygienist
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Schering-Plou

Schering-Plough Corporation
Kenilworth, New Jersey 07033
Telephone 201-558-4000
Telex 138316

January 16, 1987

Mr. Rudolph Schwarz

Dear Mr. Schwarz:
I have completed reading your thesis "A Process Review Program for Drug
Development" and found it interesting, informative and of value to the
Pharmaceutical Industry.
By bringing together the many basic elements of essential hazard control
procedures in combination with the highly specialized techniques of Pharmaceutical Research, Product Development and Manufacturing, your thesis describes
an important, timely application of the latest technology to the problem of
identifying the hazards involved in drug development.
Of particular importance to Safety and Health professionals is the development of a systematic and organized approach to the collection of data and
related information at key steps of the research and development process.
While the basic procedure has been simplified for broad based application, it
can easily be enhanced through more complex analytical and mathematical methods
as operational skill develops or as the need arises.
In my opinion, your thesis makes an important and useful contribution to the
resources available to the Safety and Health profession and will prove a
valuable tool to the Safety professional.
Yours truly,

Theodore G. Meglis
Manager, Safety & Industrial Hygiene
CSP No. 7167
P.E. No. N.J. GE 13778
TGM/kdy
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SCHERING CORPORATION
60 ORANGE STREET

Bloomfield

N.J. 07003

CABLES: SCHERING BLOOMFIELD, N.J.
TELEX: 138183
TELEPHONE: (201) 429-4000

January 28, 1987

Mr. Rudolph R. Schwarz

Dear Rudy:
First of all, let me congratulate you on the completion of your
Master's degree requirements. You've worked hard during the past
several years and should be proud of your achievement!
I read your thesis with personal interest since I have minimal
experience with chemical process hazard reviews. My overall impression
is that your dissertation is a thorough review of the process hazard
review mechanism and is an excellent starting point for a newcomer to
the field. The in-depth description of the "What If?", Failure Mode and
Effect Analysis, Fault Tree Analysis, Checklist and Hazard and
Operability Study techniques provides a useful reference for safety

professionals pursuing this topic.

Sections III and IV deal specifically with the pharmaceutical
industry and its unique hazards. This is particularly useful for an
individual who has not been previously associated with the safety of

drug manufacturing.

The process examination review forms in Appendices A, B and C
completely outline the process hazard review program for research,
development and production. They are well-formated and can be
reproduced directly for immediate use. The References section is both
current and extensive, indicating a broad consideration of the topic.
Specific criticisms regarding content and style have been discussed
with you and appropriate changes have been made in the final document.
Thank you for providing me the opportunity to review your thesis.
Sincerely yours,

/tb

Safety & Industrial Hygiene
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JosephVanHut,P.D
Manger,

APPENDIX A
LEVEL I PROCESS EXAMINATION REVIEW FORM
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LEVEL I PROCESS EXAMINATION REVIEW FORM

(To be completed by Principal Researcher)

Name of Project
Name of Initiator
Proposed Location

Process Information

I. A. Give a brief description of the work you propose. Mention main
equipment items, attach rough sketch.

B. On what scale do you plan to run?

II.

Give equations illustrating chemistry involved including

significant side reactions (show temperatures, pressures,
solvents, etc.):
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III.

Will project personnel require (check appropriate box(s))
additional training.
personal protective equipment.
medical surveillance.

Briefly explain need:

IV.

Does the experiment or process present any of the following
hazards? (check appropriate box(s))
hazardous reactions
explosive hazards
thermal hazards
mechanical hazards

environmental hazards
health hazards
fire hazards
other type hazards

Briefly explain any hazards checked:

V. A. Can this work cause pressure to develop?
Yes

No

Explain if yes:

1117

V. B. Has a relief device evaluation been performed?
Yes

VI.

No

If no, explain:

Any other safety concerns to be addressed, if so explain:

Reference Searches

Indicate references searched by checking box and attaching a copy

of data sheet to this form. If no information was found, indicate
none.
Literature
Reference Sources:

Computer Searches
(note date)

Supplier MSDS

Chemline or Chemdex

Internal MSDS

Toxline

Patty's

RTECS

Sax

NTIS

NIOSH RTEC

Hazardline

ACGIH Doc.

Merck Index
Others
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SPECIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF EXPLORATORY COMPOUNDS

Check appropriate characteristic if it applies and list those materials
including the final product next to the characteristic applying, indicate
not applicahble (N/A) if characteristic does not apply:

Characteristic

Suspected Teratogen
Carcinogen/Mutagen
Sensitizer
Corrosive
Eye or Skin Irritant
Fire Hazard
Product Safety Concern
Pollution Concern
Limited Toxicity Info
Hygroscopic
Skin Absorber

Materials Involved
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EXPERIENCE DATA AND INFORMATION SECTION

List in this section any experimental deviations experience during
exploratory work and any supplemental safety data acquired as a result of
the exploratory work.

Date

Completed by
(Principal Researcher)

Date

Reviewed by
(Safety & Industrial Hygiene)

Date

Reviewed by
(Environmental Engineer)

Date

Approved by
(Process Review Committee Chairman)

APPENDIX B
LEVEL II PROCESS EXAMINATION REVIEW FORM
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LEVEL II PROCESS EXAMINATION FORM

(To be completed by Pilot Plant Supervisor)

Name of Project
Project Leader
Proposed Location

Complete questionnaire and attach all available safety data. Forward
completed form to Process Review Committee Chairman.

I.

Has the Level I examination package from research been forwarded
and attached to this form? Yes

No

If no explain.

Will further literature searches or additional testing data such
as explosivity, rash point, differential scanning colorimetry

(DSC), thermal gravimatric analysis (TGA), etc. be required
before proceeding with its proposed scale-up? Yes
If yes explain.

III. A. What level of scale-up is proposed?

No
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B. Has a process flow diagram and material balance been
completed for the process? Yes

IV.

No

. Attach copies.

Are any new materials being introduced into the process at this
point? If so, list below in conjunction with any associated
hazards. Attach MSDS if available.
New Material

VI.

Hazard

Will elevated temperatures or pressures be recognized to run this
process? Briefly explain trial conditions.

VII. Are emergency relief systems installed to protect the equipment.
What type? Note Briefly.
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VIII. Identify any process variables other than temperature or pressure
that could or will approach hazardous conditions.
Variable

IX.

Hazardous Condition

Could any hazardous situations develop from equipment or utility
failure? If so, explain.

X.

Do emergency procedures exist to handle potential releases,
spills, fires, etc.
Yes

XI.

No

Do process directions exist for each step of the process and have
they been reviewed with the personnel assigned to conduct the

plant trial.
Process DirectionsReviewed with Personnel

Yes

No

Yes

No
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XII. Will personal protective equipment be required. If yes, indicate
type:

Respirator

Safety Shoes

Safety Goggles
Safety Shield

Acid Suit
Hand Protection

Safety Glasses

Head Protection

XIII. What type of equipment is planned for Use? (Check appropriate
types).

Reactor

Mill

Mixing Vessel

Crusher

Large Volume Glassware

Grinder

Centrifuge

Distillation Column

Pumps

Filters

XIV. Have standard operating procedures been established for the
equipment checked above? Yes

XV.

No

Recommendations Section (to be completed by the Process Review
Committee and returned to the project leader for corrective
action before sign—off approval.
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Recommendations

Date

Completed by
Pilot Plant Supervisor
Reviewed by

Date
Safety and Industrial Hygiene

Reviewed by

Date
Environmental Engineering

Reviewed by

Date
Toxicology

Approved by

Date
Process Review Committee Chairman

APPENDIX C
LEVEL III PROCESS EXAMINATION REVIEW FORM
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LEVEL III PROCESS EXAMINATION REVIEW FORM
(To be completed by Production Supervisor)

Name of Project
Production Supervisor
Proposed Location

Complete questionnaire and attach all available safety data. Forward
completed form to Process Review Committee Chairman.

Have the Level I and Level II data package been forwarded and
attached to this form? Yes

No

If no, briefly explain why below:

II.

What level of scale—up is proposed for production purposes?
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III.

What type of material handling system will be required for this
operation:

Manual transfer

Closed system transfer

Explain briefly the specific transfer operation:

IV.

What type of process equipment will be used in the production
process?

V.

Have controls been implemented to reduce or eliminate contaminant
release and/or personnel exposures? Describe what type:
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VI.

Will there be storage of raw materials, products and/or
intermediates. If so, how much? Location of storage? Indicate
below:

VII. Are hazardous conditions expected to develop in this operation
due to: (check items that apply, provides a brief explanation
below).

Explain:
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VIII. Are personnel assigned to operate equipment adequately trained in
special hazards, precautions, procedures and/or use of process
directions?

Yes

No. If no, explain below why not and

what additional training will be required.

IX.

Has a description of the process and/or process flow diagram been
attached?

X.

No.

Are emergency response and shutdown procedures in place?
Yes

XI.

Yes

No.

Are new materials being introduced into the process at this

point. If so, identify below and attached Material Safety Data
Sheet.

Material

MSDS Attached (Check)
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XII. Note any other hazards that may not have been covered by this
questionnaire:

XIII.

Recommendations Section (to be completed by the Process Review
Comittee and returned to the production supervisor for corrective
action before sign—off approval)

Recommendations
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